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Abstract 
Evolutionary costs and benefits of a newly discovered symbiosis 
between the social amoeba Dictyostelium and bacteria 
by 
Debra Lynn Adams Brock 
Recent work has shown that microorganisms are surprisingly like animals in having 
sophisticated behaviours such as cooperation, communication, and recognition, as well as 
many kinds of symbioses. Here we show first that the social amoeba Dictyostelium 
discoideum has a primitive farming symbiosis that includes dispersal and prudent 
harvesting of the crop. About one-third of wild-collected clones engage in husbandry of 
bacteria. Instead of consuming all bacteria in their patch, they stop feeding early and 
incorporate bacteria into their fruiting bodies. They then carry bacteria during spore 
dispersal and can seed a new food crop, which is a major advantage if edible bacteria are 
lacking at the new site. However, if they arrive at sites already containing appropriate 
bacteria, the costs of early feeding cessation are not compensated, which may account for 
the dichotomous nature of this farming symbiosis. We also observed farmer 
Dictyostelium discoideum clones carry bacteria that they do not use as food. We 
hypothesized that these bacteria may play a defensive role against other D. discoideum 
clones. In our second study, we investigated the impact of these bacteria-carrying 
farmers on non-farming D. discoideum clones. We found that the presence of farming 
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clones reduces spore production in non-farmers. Furthermore, this effect increases with 
frequency of farming clones, demonstrating the vulnerability of non-farming clones to 
farmers though in this experiment we had not separated the effects of the farmer clone 
and the bacteria they carry. In our third study we exposed non-farmers to a filtered 
supernatant from the most common non-food carried bacterium, Burkholderia 
xenovorans. This supernatant is likely to carry whatever the bacteria are producing. We 
treated Dictyostelium clones at the beginning of the social stage and found that the 
supernatant enhanced spore production of farming clones and hurt spore production of 
non-farming clones. This study shows that the effects of the bacteria can be restricted to 
a filtered supernatant alone. This discovery of symbiosis of D. discoideum with bacteria, 
and its impact on social interactions among D. discoideum clones will provide a fertile 
ground for further experiments on the evolution of sociality. 
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Chapter 1 
Primitive agriculture in a social amoeba 
This is reproduced as it appears in Nature. 
Brock, DA, Douglas, TE, Queller, DC, & Strassmann, JE. (2011). Primitive agriculture 
in a social amoeba. Nature, 469, 393-396. 
1.1. Abstract 
Agriculture has been a large part ofthe ecological success ofhumans1• A handful of 
animals, notably the fungus growing ants, termites, and ambrosia beetles2-4, have 
advanced agriculture that involves dispersing and seeding of food propagules, cultivation 
ofthe crop, and sustainable harvesting5• More primitive examples, which could be called 
husbandry because they involve fewer adaptations, include marine snails farming 
intertidal fungi6 and damselfish farming algae7• Recent work has shown that 
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microorganisms are surprisingly like animals in having sophisticated behaviours such as 
cooperation, communication8•9, and recognition10•11 , as well as many kinds of 
symbioses12-15 _ We now show that the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum exhibits 
a primitive farming symbiosis that includes dispersal and prudent harvesting of the crop_ 
About a third of wild-collected clones engage in husbandry of bacteria. Instead of 
consuming all bacteria in their patch, they stop feeding early and incorporate bacteria into 
their fruiting bodies. They then carry bacteria during spore dispersal and can seed a new 
food crop, a major advantage if edible bacteria are lacking at the new site. However, if 
they arrive at sites already containing appropriate bacteria, the costs of early feeding 
cessation are not compensated, which may account for the dichotomous nature of this 
farming symbiosis. The striking convergent evolution between bacterial husbandry in 
social amoebas and fungus farming in social insects makes sense because 
multigenerational benefits of farming go to already-established kin groups. 
1.2. Results and Discussion 
The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum is well-known for its social interactions. 
When prey bacteria become scarce, amoebae aggregate by the tens of thousands and 
produce a migratory slug and then a multicellular fruiting body in which about 20% of 
cells die to form a sterile stalk. The stalk aids the dispersal of the remaining cells, which 
differentiate into spores in a spherical structure called the sorus16•17 (Fig. lA). We now 
2 
Figure 1 - Fruiting body structure and sorus contents from farmer and non-farmer 
D.discoideum clones. a) The fruiting body is composed of two main parts: the sorus 
which contains the fertile spores and the stalk which holds the sorus aloft to facilitate 
spore dispersal. b) Bacteria and D. discoideum spores are present in the contents of a 
farmer sorus (left panel) but only spores are present in the contents of a non-farmer sorus 
(right panel). Bar equals 5 micrometers. c) Sorus contents for 6 random, individual 
fruiting bodies from each of 4 farmers and 4 non-farmers were spotted on individual 
nutrient agar plates. All farmer sorus contents exhibited bacterial growth, whereas no 
bacterial growth was observed in sori from non-farmers. Plates were photographed after 
2 days of growth. 
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show that about a third of wild-collected clones husband bacteria through the sporulation 
and dispersal process. We call these clones farmers because they carry, seed, and 
prudently harvest their food, but the farming is primitive because no active cultivation is 
known. 
4 
At first glance, beneficial interactions occurring between D. discoideum and the 
bacteria would be unexpected. In the unicellular state, D. discoideum are solitary 
predators ofbacteria18, and bacteria employ a wide range of strategies to deter 
predation19. Early life history work on another species, Dictyostelium mucoroides, 
suggested the possibility of symbiosis with bacteria20'21 , but did not document this 
interaction experimentally. The possibility fell out of favor, particularly after Raper18 
found no support for a symbiotic relationship and much support for a predatory one. 
However he studied only a single D. discoideum clone, and the extent of natural variation 
remains largely unexplored. Our study used a population of 35 wild D. discoideum 
clones isolated from soil collected at Mountain Lake Biological Station in Virginia and at 
Lake Itasca Biological Station in Minnesota (Table S 1 ). 
We observed that the sorus contents of some of the clones contained bacteria in 
addition to D. discoideum spores (Fig. 1B). To confirm this observation, we initially 
chose 4 clones that appeared to have bacteria in their sori and 4 clones that did not. We 
picked up the sorus contents of 6 random fruiting bodies from each and then spotted these 
individually on nutrient agar plates to test for bacterial growth (Fig. 1 C). This assay 
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Fanner Re- ~ore ~ore Bacterial Prolif; . C~ne TJ'Pe I'!ligra.mn prodtK:mn: prodtK:mn: Soil era.mn 
test associa.mn benefits com Ul'age 
Q$1 NF X X X X X X X X 
Q$4 NF X X X X X X 
Q$6 NF X X X X 
Q$8 NF X X X X 
Q$9 NF X X X X X X X 
Q$11 F X X X X X X X X 
Q$12 F X X X 
Q$14 NF X X X X 
Q$15 NF X X X X 
Q$17 NF X X X X X X X X 
Q$18 NF X X X X 
Q$21 F X X X X X X X X 
Q$22 F X X X X X X X X 
Q$23 F X X X X X X X X 
Q$152 F X X 
Q$154 NF X 
Q$155 F X X X 
Q$157 NF X 
Q$158 NF X X 
Q$159 F X X 
Q$160 NF X X 
Q$161 F X X 
Q$174 NF X 
Table Sl. List of Dictyostelium discoideum clones used in each experimental assay. 
Not all of the 35 wild clones collected were used experimentally. Under heading Type, 
NF stands for non-farmer and F stands for farmer. 
confirmed that sori from some clones consistently contained bacteria that could initiate 
new populations (top panel), and others did not (bottom panel). Bacteria also grew when 
directional light induced the multicellular slugs to migrate away from the original 
locations to bacteria-free zones of a plate before fruiting, indicating that bacteria are 
carried in the slugs. Four sets of wild isolates tested in this way yielded 36% farmers: 
(farmers/all= 13/35 overall; 4/9 from Minnesota; 5/14, 3/9, 1/3 from 3 sample dates from 
Virginia). These data suggest that farmer clones are common, are found in the same 
locations as non-farmer clones, and are therefore likely have access to similar bacteria. 
To confirm that farmers and non-farmers belong to the same species, we constructed 
a Bayesian phylogenetic tree created from combined mitochondrial, ribosomal and 
variable nuclear DNA sequence data from 14 clones (5 farmers and 9 non-farmers; Fig. 
S1). Farmers were interspersed in the phylogeny with non-farmers, as expected ifthe 
trait is shuffled through the species by sex22• We also calculated pair-wise genetic 
distances between farmer/farmer pairs, non-farmer/non-farmer pairs and farmer/non-
farmer pairs and found no differences in the distributions (Fig. S2). 
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We sequenced a portion of the bacterial 16S ribosomal gene to identify the species of 
carried bacteria. Farmers carry a variety of species of bacteria, with diversity both within 
and between farmer clones, and diversity is likely to be underestimated since not all 
bacteria are culturable by our methods (Table S2). About half of these bacterial 
,----QS8 
I----IQS21l Farmer 
r-----QS14 
r---lQS11l Farmer 
QS18 
lQS22l Farmer 
r-----QS15 
QS9 
lQS23l Farmer 
r--- disc NW 001852na 
.-----QS4 
QS1 
lQS12l Farmer 
r---QS6 
'-----QS17 
'------- citr DQ340385 
Fig. Sl. Farmers and non-farmers are the same species. Here we present a Bayesian 
phylogenetic tree created from combined mitochondrial, ribosomal, and variable nuclear 
DNA sequence data from 14 farmer and non-farmer D. discoideum clones and sister 
species D. citrinum. The D. discoideum dataset contained 82 variable sites and 31 
informative sites. Branch lengths are not drawn to scale. Numbers adjacent to nodes 
indicate Bayesian posterior probability values greater than 90%. We identified three well-
supported clades with posterior probabilities about 95%, and each of these contained both 
farmer and non-farmer clones. This phylogeny indicates that farmers and non-farmers 
are well mixed within the species, consistent with the traits being distributed by sex. 
NW001852778 is the D. discoideum reference sequence. 
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Fig. S2. Genetic distances do not differ according to farmer status. Distribution of 
pairwise genetic distances (p-distance) between farmer/farmer pairs, non-farmer/non-
farmer pairs, and farmer/non-farmer pairs. Nearly all the clones are genetically distinct at 
these sequences (89 of91 pairwise comparisons). Distances were calculated from 
combined mitochondrial, ribosomal, and variable nuclear DNA sequence data. 
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D.discoideum Location % 
farmer clones collected Bacterium ID Closest relative in GenBank Identity 
QS11 Mt. Lake, VA lllbac1 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS12 Mt. Lake, VA 12/bac1 Stenotrophomonas maltophilia K279a 98 
QS21 Mt. Lake, VA 21/bac1 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS22 Mt. Lake, VA 22/bac1 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS23 Mt. Lake, VA 23/bac1 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS152 Mt. Lake, VA 152/bac 1-6/7* Enterobacter sakazakii ATCC BAA- 98 894 
" Mt. Lake, VA 152/bac2-6/7 Pseudomonas jluorescens Pf-5 98 
QS155 Mt. Lake, VA 155/bac1-1111 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 99 
" Mt. Lake, VA 155/bac2-11/1 * Stenotrophomonas maltophilia K279a 99 
QS159 Mt. Lake, VA 159/bac1-14/7* Burkholderia phytofirmans psJN 98 
QS161 Mt. Lake, VA 161/bac1-1 * Burkholderia phytofirmans psJN 97 
" Mt. Lake, VA 161/bac2-1 Pseudomonas jluorescens Pf-5 99 
" Mt. Lake, VA 161/bac3-1* Pseudomonas jluorescens Pf-5 99 
QS165 Lake ltaska, MN 165/bac1-1A * Flavobacteriumjohnsoniae UW101 94 
QS171 Lake Itaska, MN 171/bac1-7A* Flavobacteriumjohnsoniae UW101 94 
QS172 Lake Itaska, MN 172/bac 1-8A * Flavobacterium johnsoniae UW1 01 93 
QS173 Lake Itaska, MN 173/bac1-9A * Flavobacterium johnsoniae UW 101 94 
Table S2. 16S rDNA sequence affiliation in GenBank for bacteria isolated from 
wild farmer Dictyostelium discoideum clones. All farmer clones also carry the 
laboratory food bacteria we provided in addition to the bacteria listed with the exception 
ofQS152 which only carries the listed bacteria. Co-isolated bacteria used as food by D. 
discoideum farmers are shown as starred. We determined whether the bacteria could be 
used as food by rearing the farmer amoebas with a pure culture of bacteria isolated from 
that farmer's sorus. The function, if any, of other bacteria identified but not starred is 
currently unknown. 
--------------
strains serve as good food sources for D. discoideum, generally for fanners and non-
fanners alike (Table S2). The function of the other half, if any, is unknown, but all 
fanner strains transport and use the food bacteria supplied in the lab (either Klebsiella 
aero genes or Escherichia coli), and we focus the remainder of the paper on food 
carrymg. 
Carrying bacteria is a consistent clone-specific trait, and these clones show a number 
of differences from non-fanner clones that affect life history and fitness. To establish the 
consistency of the trait, we eliminated all living, carried bacteria from 4 farmers, and 4 
non-fanner controls by treating them with antibiotics. We then grew them on dead K 
aerogenes as a food source, and spotting tests as in Fig. 1 confirmed that they became 
bacteria free. When these bacteria-free clones were then grown on live K aerogenes, all 
fanners regained an association and had these bacteria in their sori while non-fanners did 
not (Fig. 2). 
To examine costs and benefits in the fanner-bacteria interaction, we compared 
fanners with non-fanners under several conditions. Soil is a very structured, 
heterogeneous environment in the wild where bacteria could occur in patchy, 
monospecific colonies of variable cell numbers23•24, and the patchiness is accentuated 
since some Dictyostelids have distinct food preferences25• We therefore mimicked spore 
dispersal to both bacteria-poor and bacteria-rich sites. For the former, we transferred D. 
discoideum spores to plates with nutrients for bacteria, but without added bacteria 
10 
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100 -
c: 
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40 -~ (I) 
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Farmers Non-farmers 
Figure 2- Farmers readily re-associate with bacteria suggesting a persistent 
interaction. After antibiotic treatment to eliminate carried bacteria, re-association with 
bacteria was tested by growing 4 farmer and 4 non-farmer clones on K. aero genes. We 
spotted 10 random sori from each clone individually on nutrient agar plates, and counted 
positive/negative growth of bacteria in each sorus after 2 days. Farmers significantly 
differ from non-farmers in their ability to associate with bacteria (F 1,6=48.864, p<0.001 ; 
error bars indicate s.e.m.). Pictured below the graph are representative examples of sorus 
contents for farmer and non-farmer clones after one round of growth with live bacteria. 
Farmer clone sori contain bacteria; no bacterial growth was detected for non-farmers, 
even after 1 0 days. 
(Fig. 3A). We found that bacteria transported via the farmer spores proliferate and are 
consumed by the farmers that also proliferate, and then sporulate after the social stage, 
whereas non-farmers with no bacterial partners produce hardly any spores (F1,6=58.97, 
p<O.OOOl). Farmers are thus able to capitalize on available nutrients by carrying their 
own food bacteria in their sori. This difference disappears, and farmers do as poorly as 
non-farmers, if they are previously made bacteria-free using antibiotics (F1,6=0.49, 
p=0.8082; data not shown). Next we tested whether farming was costly when spores are 
transferred instead to a site where edible bacteria are abundant, reducing or eliminating 
the advantage to farmers of bringing their own bacteria. Farmer clones then produce 
fewer spores than non-farmers from a given number of live bacteria (F1,12 = 64.36, 
p<0.0001; Fig. 3B). Therefore, carrying seed stocks can be advantageous or 
disadvantageous, depending on bacterial availability at new sites. 
Sites entirely lacking bacteria in nature are rare, but farmers could still gain by 
bringing preferred bacteria (whatever allowed them to flourish and sporulate in their 
previous site), just as humans seed preferred plants in an already green world. We 
therefore tested spore production for farmers and non-farmers on unsterilized soil 
collected from 2 separate locations at the Houston Arboretum and Nature Center in 
Houston, Texas. We determined the colony forming units (CPU's) of culturable bacteria 
at the 2 sites for soil1 and soil2 to be 1.3-2.3 x 108 and 0.6-0.64 x 108 CFU' s per gram of 
soil respectively. However, the bacteria already present in the soil do not make bacteria 
carrying superfluous. Under these conditions farmers produced more spores than non-
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Figure 3 - The advantage of carrying 
food is context dependent. a) Farmers 
produce more spores than non-farmers 
when colonizing plates with bacterial food 
substrates, but without bacteria (FI ,6 = 
58.97, p<O.OOOl). We used 3 replicates of 
each of 4 farmer and 4 non-farmer clones. 
b) Farmers produce fewer spores than non-
farmers when provided a fixed amount of 
live bacteria (F1,12 = 64.36, p<O.OOOl). We 
used 3 replicates from each of 5 farmer and 
9 non-farmer clones, (the results are similar 
when only the 8 clones in (a) are used). c) 
Farmers produce more spores than non-
farmers on unsterilized soil (Soil 1 = F1 ,10 = 
14.82, p=0.0032; Soil2 = Fuo= 26.21, 
p=0.0005). We used individual sori 
collected from 6 farmers and 6 non-farmers 
to test spore production after one round of 
the social stage. Error bars indicate s.e.m. 
for all graphs. d) Representative examples 
of farmer and non-farmer fruiting bodies formed after the social stage on unsterilized soil. 
Bar equals 1 millimeter. 
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fanners for both soil locations (soil 1: Fl,lo=14.82, p=0.0032; soil 2: FI,Io=26.21, 
p=0.0005; Fig. 3C and D), as well as many more fruiting bodies (soil1: Fl,lo=35.78, 
p=0.0001; soil2: F 1,10=9.31, p=0.0122; data not shown). Fanner sori continued to carry 
their original bacteria ( 43 out of 44 isolates checked by sequencing) whereas no bacteria 
were isolated from non-fanner sori. This suggests the bacteria available in the two test 
soils were not very suitable for both non-fanners and fanners, so the bacteria carried by 
the fanners allowed them to flourish compared to the non-farmers. 
We hypothesized that the lower success of fanners when bacteria are provided stems 
from prudent harvesting. D. discoideum amoebae normally leave the solitary stage and 
enter the social stage when food is exhausted 16' 17, but fanners may do so sooner to save 
some bacteria for transport. We therefore measured the number of uneaten bacteria 
present along a developmental time course (Fig. 4A). During the solitary amoeba stage 
(Day 1) there was no difference in bacterial density among treatments (also Day 1 
fanners and non-fanners did not differ significantly in number of amoebas; F~,l7=0.6733, 
p=0.4233; data not shown). During the social stage, however, bacterial usage differs 
significantly between fanners and non-fanners for all time points. Non-farmers eat all 
the bacteria, while fanners leave many bacteria unconsumed, roughly half the number 
present as compared to bacteria grown alone. Figure 4B shows representative fanner and 
non-fanner clones photographed at Day 5, revealing that only the fanners entered the 
social stage and formed fruiting bodies in the presence of uneaten bacteria. Thus, it 
appears that fanner clones forego considerable food in order to save some for co-
dispersal. 
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(Type F2,19= 106.18, 
p<0.0001, Day F2.3&= 10.23, p=0.0003, Type*Day F4,38= 10.60, p<0.0001; Significant 
differences found within each day are indicated by different letters which reflect results 
of a post hoc Tukey HSD test). At the solitary amoeba stage (Day 1) no difference in 
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bacterial density was found among the three treatments (F2,19=1.2943, p=0.2972). b) 
Bacterial usage of representative clones. Farmer clones develop fruiting bodies before all 
bacteria are exhausted while non-farmers consume all accessible food sources before 
fruiting. Examples of fruiting bodies are marked with arrows and appear as white dots. 
Clones were photographed on Day 5. Bar equals 3 mm. c) Migration. The average 
distance farmer slugs migrate towards light is less than for non-farmer slugs (F1,14=87.59, 
p<O.OOl). 8 clones of each type were used, with 2 replicates. Error bars equal s.e.m. for 
both graphs. 
Farmer clones also migrate significantly less far than non-farmers during the mobile 
slug stage that immediately precedes fruiting (F1,14=87.59 p<O.OOl). This might be a cost 
caused by bacterial interference, or it might be an evolved response of not needing to 
move as far when farmers carry their own bacteria. Either way, it adds to the list of 
significant differences between farmers and non-farmers. 
An alternative explanation for the apparent costs - leaving some bacteria unharvested 
and reduced slug migration- is that the bacteria are pathogenic and harm D. discoideum. 
However, the pathogen hypothesis does not account for why the farmer strains would be 
infectible by many bacteria and why infection is highly consistent, even after curing. 
Neither does it explain why all farmers carry food. Moreover, it does not explain why 
infection causes no cost to growth in the solitary stage (Fig. S3; F 1,n=0.72, p=0.4132). 
Instead, the costs appear precisely where the farming hypothesis predicts (saving some 
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food for transport) or where it provides a plausible explanation (less need for slug 
migration). However, a mixed explanation seems possible. Carrying food bacteria could 
have the side effect of sometimes taking up useless or harmful bacteria. The existence of 
the farmer polymorphism will allow additional within-species comparisons that should 
help in exploring the mechanisms, which are as yet unknown, but could be very simple 
alterations in timing of aggregation, sensitivity to bacteria, or ability to produce a specific 
enzyme or toxin. The abundant scientific resources available for this model organism 
have recently proven very useful in understanding the genetics of their social 
interactions26-29• They should prove similarly useful here, providing a unique model 
system for probing the genetics of eukaryote-bacterial symbioses. 
The connection of farming with sociality may not be coincidental, because social 
species have suitably structured populations. In this social microbe, the advantage of 
prudent harvesting and seeding is large because it can benefit many generations of cell 
descendants before fruiting. Moreover, the high relatedness of natural fruiting bodies27 
minimizes any potential exploitation by non-farmers, who could either consume the 
bacteria that the farmers would save to carry, or freeload when co-dispersed with farmer 
spores and their bacteria. This same advantage -long-lived groups ofkin- provides 
similarly fertile ground for agriculture in the ants and termites that are the most 
sophisticated non-human farmers. 
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1.3. Methods Summary 
1.3.1. Isolation of wild Dictyostelium discoideum strains. 
Isolation techniques followed published methods30 with the exception that 20g or 
more soil samples were collected at each location instead of 0.5g samples. 
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1.3.2. Culture conditions. 
We grew all wild isolates from spores on SM/5-agar plates (2g glucose, 2g 
BactoPeptone (Oxoid), 2g yeast extract (Oxoid), 0.2g MgCb, 1.9g KHP04, lg K2HP04, 
and 15g agar/liter) in association with bacteria Klebsiella aerogenes or Escherichia coli 
at room temperature. 
1.3.3. PCR amplification and sequence identification of novel bacterial isolates. 
We followed the procedures outlined in "Identifying Unknown Bacteria Using 
Biochemical and Molecular Methods" found at 
www.nslc. wustl.edu/elgin/genomics/Bio3055/IdUnknBacteria06.pdf with one exception. 
Bacteria to be cloned and identified were grown on and collected from SM/5-agar plates. 
PCR fragments generated (using the above procedure) were sequenced at Lone Star Labs 
(Houston, TX). We used the NCBI web site http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/cgi-
bin/Entrez/genom table cgi as the search tool for sequences to identify bacteria to 
species. 
1.3.4. Data analyses. 
We analyzed our data using standard analysis of variance methodology with fixed 
(farmer and non-farmer) effects and random effect (clone) for all experimental assays. 
The data analysis was generated using SAS software, Version 9-1 of the SAS System for 
Windows, Copyright 2002-2003, SAS Institute Inc. 
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Experimental assays are described in Full Methods in Supplementary 
Information. 
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1.5. Full Methods for Supplementary Information 
1.5.1. Isolation of wild Dictyostelium discoideum strains. 
Isolation techniques followed published methods30 with the exception that 20g or 
more soil samples were collected at each location instead of 0.5g samples. 
1.5.2. Culture conditions. 
We grew all wild isolates from spores on SM/5-agar plates (2 g glucose, 2 g 
BactoPeptone (Oxoid), 2 g yeast extract (Oxoid), 0.2 g MgCb, 1.9 g KHP04, 1 g 
K2HP04, and 15 g agar/liter) in association with bacteria Klebsiella aerogenes or 
Escherichia coli at room temperature. 
1.5.3. PCR amplification and sequence identification of novel bacterial 
isolates. 
We followed the procedures outlined in "Identifying Unknown Bacteria Using 
Biochemical and Molecular Methods" found at 
www.nslc.wustl.edu/elgin/genomics/Bio3055 /IdUnknBacteria06.pdf with one 
exception. Bacteria to be cloned and identified were grown on and collected from SM/5-
agar plates. PCR fragments generated (using the above procedure) were sequenced at 
Lone Star Labs (Houston, TX). We used the NCBI web site 
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http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov /cgi-bin/Entrez/genom table cgi as the search tool for 
sequences to identify bacteria to species. 
1.5.4. Data analyses. 
We analyzed our data using standard analysis of variance methodology with fixed 
(farmer and non-farmer) effects and random effect (clone) for all experimental assays. 
The data analysis was generated using SAS software, Version 9-1 of the SAS System for 
Windows, Copyright 2002-2003 , SAS Institute Inc. SAS and all other SAS Institute Inc. 
product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of SAS Institute Inc., 
Cary, NC, USA. 
1.5.5. Experimental assays. 
-Farmer test. We picked up the sorus contents of 6-12 random fruiting bodies 
developed on SM/5 plates in association with E. coli or K. aero genes from each wild 
clone to be tested using a filtered pipet tip. The sorus contents were spotted individually 
on SM/5 agar plates and assessed for bacterial growth after 2 days at room temperature. 
-Reassociation assay. We used a population of 4 farmers and 4 non-farmers 
treated to eliminate all living, carried bacteria. To accomplish this, clones were grown on 
SM/5 agar plates containing antibiotics (0.1 g ampicillin, 0.3 g streptomycin sulfate/ liter) 
using dead E. coli as a limited food source to allow the spores to hatch and develop. 
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Dead E. coli was prepared by autoclaving a suspension of E. coli and KK2 (2.25 g 
KH2P04 and 0.67 g K2HP04 per liter H20) for 20 minutes at 121° C. After autoclaving, 
the density of dead bacteria was set to an OD600 of 6.0. Treated clones were allowed to 
form fruiting bodies, spores were collected, and the process was repeated. We performed 
the farmer test after the second round and no bacterial growth was seen in the sorus 
contents of test clones even after 10 days. We harvested spores from the bacteria-free, 
cured clones in KK2 and the spore density for each clone was determined by serial 
dilution using a hemacytometer under a light microscope. Spores from these treated 
clones were then reintroduced to live E. coli, plated on SM/5 agar plates, and allowed to 
form fruiting bodies. 10 random sori were collected individually from each clone and 
tested for bacterial growth following the farmer test above. 
-Migration assay. We tested the slug migration ability of 8 farmers and 8 non-
farmers per replicate for 2 replicates. Duplicate plates were set up for each clone per 
replicate. For each plate, we prepared a slurry of 5 x 106 spores of one D. discoideum 
clone, K aerogenes, and KK2. We then applied the slurry to the edge of a 150 x15 mm 
petri plate containing 80 ml of nutrient-free agar (0.198 g KH2P04, 0.0356 g Na2HP04, 
and 15 g agar per liter), and allowed the slurry to dry. Each plate was wrapped in 
aluminum foil and a small pinhole was made directly opposite the spores and bacteria to 
provide directional light. The wrapped plates were placed in a lighted 21 °C incubator for 
84 hours to allow slugs to form and migrate. For each clone, we counted the distance 
travelled by slugs in each of five, 1.5 em bands across the nutrient-free agar plate, and 
calculated the average distance travelled for all slugs. 
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-Spore production assay. We tested two conditions: 1) Nutrients for bacterial 
growth but no outside bacteria were provided as food for the test clones. 2) Nutrients for 
bacterial growth as well as bacteria were provided as food for the test clones. For the 
first condition, we used 4 farmer clones and 4 non-farmer clones per replicate with 3 
replicates. We spread 200 Jll of 1 x 105 spores+ dead E coli in KK2 (O.D. A600 6.0) on 
100 x 15 mm SM/5 agar plates. Bacterial growth is possible for farmers in this condition. 
After development was complete, spores were collected by washing the plates with KK2 
+ 0.1% NP-40 (Calbiochem, La Jolla, CA). The total number of spores produced by each 
clone was determined by counting using a hemacytometer and a light microscope. As a 
control to assess confounding growth differences between farmers and non-farmers, all 8 
clones were grown as above but the plates were supplemented with antibiotics (see 
reassociation assay above) to eliminate any potential food bacteria carried by the clones. 
No farming is possible in this set-up. For the second condition, we used 5 farmer clones 
and 9 non-farmer clones per replicate with 3 replicates. For the assay, we prepared 
nutrient-free agar plates (see migration assay) laid with a grid of equidistant 13 mm 
AABP 04700 (Millipore, Bedford, MA) black filter squares. Filters were spotted 
individually with 5 x 105 spores in a slurry of live K. aerogenes and KK2 (OD600 6.0). 
Clones were spotted in a random order determined by a random number generator. 
Duplicate samples were made for each clone for each experiment. Clones were allowed 
to hatch, grow, and develop under direct light to limit potential movement of slugs before 
final culmination to fruiting bodies. Development was complete for all clones after 4 
days. Each filter was collected and placed in a 1.5 ml conical eppendorf tube containing 
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1.0 ml KK2 + 0.1% NP-40 alternative. Tubes were vortexed briefly to evenly disperse 
the spores and counted as above without dilution to determine density. 
-Soil assay. We collected soil from two separate locations in the Houston 
Arboretum and Nature Center (N 29° 46', W 95° 27'). Thin, non-nutrient agar plates 
were prepared to provide a humid environment for spores to hatch and to hold the soil in 
place. Soil was then layered to a -2-3mm depth in a half-moon pattern with an empty 
space at the center line atop the starving agar on each plate (see Fig. S4a). We used 12 
clones consisting of 6 farmers and 6 non-farmers. Farmer/non-farmer clones were 
randomly paired on each plate (one on each half-moon of soil) as a check for plate 
environment bias. Each pair was tested on two separate plates for each soil type. Data 
analysis was reported unpaired as no plate environment bias was detected. For the assay, 
fruiting body sori were collected from stock plates of all 12 clones previously prepared 
on the same day by plating 2 x 105 spores in association with K. aero genes on SM/5 agar 
plates. The contents of an individual sorus for either a farmer or non-farmer clone were 
picked up using a filtered pipet tip and placed on the unsterilized soil in the locations 
marked by a colored circle (see Fig. S4b). Three farmer sori and three non-farmer sori 
were placed on each experimental plate in this manner. After 3 days at room temperature 
under direct overhead light, all plates were viewed under a dissecting microscope to 
locate and collect all fruiting bodies formed. Fruiting bodies found were generally 
located in the same area as spotted on the soil. Whole fruiting bodies from all 3 spots per 
plate for either the farmer or non-farmer were collected and placed together in an 
eppendorftube containing 1 milliliter KK2 + 0.1% NP-40. Tubes were vortexed briefly 
to disperse the spores, and the spores were counted without dilution using a 
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Fig. S4. Plate set-up for soil assay. a) Soil collected from two separate locations at the 
Houston Arboretum and Nature Center was layered to a depth of 2-3mm on top of a thin 
layer of non-nutrient agar in a half-moon pattern. b) The contents of an individual sorus 
for either a farmer or a non-farmer clone were picked up using a filtered pipet tip and 
placed on the unsterilized soil in the locations marked by a colored circle. Three farmer 
sori and three non-farmer sori were individually placed on each experimental plate in this 
manner. 
hemacytometer. The change in spore number for each clone was then calculated. To 
determine the initial number of spores spotted for each clone without diluting sorus 
contents, a proxy was used. The sorus contents from 10 random fruiting bodies from 
each clone were collected and counted as above. The average count for these 10 fruiting 
bodies was used to determine the clone's average spore number per sorus spotted on the 
experimental plates. Additionally, we determined presence or absence of bacteria in the 
sori as well as bacteria identity for positive growth using a subset of 10 clones (5 farmers 
and 5 non-farmers) on both types of soil. We performed serial dilutions in KK2 of 80 
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sori contents (44 farmer and 34 non-farmer) and the clonal isolates recovered were used 
for sequencing following the same methods as in '"PCR amplification and sequence 
identification of novel bacterial isolates" described above. 
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-Bacteria usage assay. We collected spores from a population of 11 non-farmer 
and 9 farmer clones. For each clone we individually spotted 4, 30J.1l spots of 3 x 104 
spores mixed with live K. aerogenes (O.D.600 3.0) on a SM/5 plate as well as spotting K. 
aerogenes alone as a control. Bacterial density was determined by using a sterilized 
inoculating loop to collect all growth from one spot for each clone into a 1.5 ml 
eppendorf tube containing 1 ml of KK2, vortexing to obtain a uniform suspension, 
removing hatched amoebae or spores by briefly centrifuging at 2000g to pellet, and then 
determining the absorbance (O.D.600) of the remaining bacteria. Data points were 
collected on Day 1, 3, 5, and 7. To determine if confounding differences in spore 
germination occurred among clones, the number of hatched amoebae was determined for 
each clone on Day 1 by counting using a hemacytometer. 
-Proliferation assay. To determine vegetative doubling rates during exponential 
growth, we grew each clone separately by plating 1 x 104 log-phase cells per plate in 
association with K. aerogenes as a food source on replicated SM/5 agar plates. After 12 
hours of growth, we collected all cells from a plate, diluted the cells in a measured 
amount ofKK2, and counted the number of cells present using a hemacytometer. We 
repeated this process for plates grown for 18, 24, 30, 36, and 42 hours. We conducted the 
experiment in two temporally independent blocks. To analyze the data, we log 
transformed the counts, determined the slope for each clone, and performed a full factor 
ANCOVA. 
1.5.6. Phylogeny construction. 
-DNA sequencing. We extracted DNA from spores using a Chelex/Proteinase K 
extraction protocol. We amplified a non-coding region of the mitochondrial genome 
(mtDNA), regions of the nuclear ribosomal DNA (rDNA) and 6 variable fragments of 
nuclear DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) with the primers listed in Table S3, 
using the following protocol (step 1: 2 minutes at 94°C; step 2: 30 seconds at 94°C; step 
3: 30 seconds starting at 65°C and decreasing 1° per cycle; step 4: 1 minute at 72°C; step 
5: 15 cycles to step 2; step 6: 30 seconds at 94°C; step 7: 30 seconds at 50°C; step 8: 1 
minute at 72°C; step 9: 25 times to step 6; step 10: 6 minutes at 72°C). We cleaned the 
PCR product with USB (Cleveland, OH) ExoSAP-IT and then sequenced using Perkin 
Elmer Applied Biosystems (Foster City, CA) Big Dye 3.1 chemistry and a 3100 genetic 
analyzer. We analyzed approximately 4300 base pairs of the nucleotide sequence of 
nuclear 17S, 5.8S, 26S and 5S rDNA regions, approximately 800 base pairs ofthe 
nucleotide sequence ofmtDNA (LSU intron) and approximately 3700 base pairs of 
variable nuclear DNA from chromosomes 1, 2, 3 and 4. We aligned the sequences using 
the programs Lasergene SeqMan v. 7.0.0 and BioEdit Sequence Alignment Editor v. 
7.0.5.2. 
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Table S3. PCR primer pairs for amplification of DNA sequence data. The primer 
pairs for amplification of the variable nuclear DNA fragments, identified here by gene 
and chromosome location, were designed by Flowers et al. 1 
Region 
- -------------
17S 
ITS-5.8S 
~ --
26S 
IGS-5S 
LSU intron 
-------------- ----
Gene GDT6 (Chr 1) 
Gene JC2V2_0_01936 (Chr 2) 
Direction 
--- -- ----
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
------------- --
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
-~-~-~ - ~----------- ~·~ r- - . ~ 
Gene GENEDDB0233776 (Chr 2) Forward 
Gene PGTD (Chr 3) 
Gene BC4V2_0_00201 (Chr 4) 
--
-----
Gene BC4V2_0_00636 (Chr 4) 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
Forward 
Reverse 
---- - -
Forward 
Reverse 
Primer Sequence (5' to 3' direction) 
------------------------ -------
GCTCGTAGTTGAAGTTTAAG 
AGATAATACAAGCTGAACTA 
CTAAGATATAGTAAGGATTG 
ATGATCCATCCGCAGGTTCA 
~-- ~--~~--- -~~---- ~~~--- -----~~ ~----
ACGGTAAAGTTAACGGATCG 
ACTCTCACCCAAGTATAACA 
AAACTGCGATAATTCACTTG 
CCGTCTTCACTCGCCGTTAC 
---- ----- ----- ----- ---------
ATTACCCGCTGAACTTAAGC 
TCCGAAGATAACCTGTAGAC 
TCATCAAGAGTGCAAAATGG 
ACATCGCCAGTTCTGCTTAC 
ATTCACAAAGTGTTGGATTG 
GCTTACTATGGACAAATGGC 
ACGGATAAAAGGTACGCTAG 
TAATTAATACACCAGTGATC 
---- ----- - ------- - - -
CCAGGTTATACAGGAGTATTCG 
AGACAATCATCACCTTGTGG 
TCAAGGTCGTTTCTCAGTACC 
GTATCAATGCCACCAAATGC 
----- ------ ---------- ------ --------
CCATCATTCTCTTCCACTTCTCC 
GGCGAGGATTGTTTTTGTCC 
ACGCTTTCATCGATCCATCC 
GGCCAACTGATACACTTTCACC 
GGTGGGATCTTAATTCAACG 
ACCTGCACCTCTAACTACCC 
------ - ----- -----
CATTGGCCCTCAAGATTACC 
TCAACTTCATCACCCCATCC 
Flowers, J. M. et al. Variation, Sex, and Social Cooperation: Molecular Population 
Genetics of the Social Amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum. PLoS Genet 6, e1001013 
(2010). 
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-Data analysis. We used comparative DNA sequence data from 14 individual 
clones (QS numbers 1, 4, 6, 8-9, 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, and 21-23) to estimate gene 
trees/phylogenies and to estimate pairwise genetic distances between clones. These 14 
clones represent 5 farmers and 9 non-farmers. We used Bayesian methods for 
phylogenetic reconstruction. Using MrBayes v. 3.1 31 , we estimated a phylogeny for each 
dataset based on the GTR+I+r model of molecular evolution. In addition, two high-
frequency, polymorphic indels (one in the mtDNA and one in the variable nuclear DNA) 
were scored as standard presence/absence characters and were included in the analysis 
with weighting equal to the nucleotide polymorphisms. For each analysis, four 
Metropolis-coupled Markov chains were run for 250,000 burn-in generations followed by 
1.75 x 106 generations of data collection. We used the software program MEGA version 
432 to estimate pairwise genetic distances between clones using the p-distance algorithm. 
We analyzed sequence data from all14 individual clones. Gaps and missing data were 
eliminated in pairwise sequence comparisons. 
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Chapter 2 
Dictyostelium discoideum farmer clones harm 
non-farmer clones in the social stage 
2.1. Abstract 
Improving one's competitive ability for resources has resulted in many kinds of 
adaptations. An adaptation that allows the eukaryotic amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum 
to carry food bacteria through the social stage is one such example. These D. discoideum 
clones, known as farmers, are genetically distinct and co-occur with non-carriers. The 
bacteria that farmers carry are a valuable, preferred food resource which can be exploited 
by conspecifics. Here we examine the competitive ability of farmers against non-farmers 
under conditions that lead to the non-feeding social stage and ask whether the adaptation 
to carry bacteria has altered the competitive abilities of farmer clones. Competitive 
abilities are measured as the number of reproductive spores, per initial cell, produced by a 
clone when allowed to complete the social stage in mixtures with a clone of a different 
genotype. The winning clone makes more spores, contributing less to the sterile stalk 
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cells. We find that the presence of farming clones reduces spore production in all non-
farmers. Furthermore, this effect increases with the frequency of the farming clone in the 
mixture. In contrast, farmers are unaffected by the relative frequency of farmers and non-
farmers. These experiments demonstrate that farmer clones have increased competitive 
ability against non-farming con-specifics in the all-important social stage. This could 
reduce codispersal for farmer and non-farmer spores, and therefore reduce exploitation by 
non-farmers in the next generation. 
2.2. Introduction 
Microorganisms lack complex cognitive abilities, but like vertebrates, show 
surprisingly sophisticated social behaviors such as cooperation, communication J-J and 
even recognition 4-6. Processes that in vertebrates might have been mediated by the brain, 
in microbes are mediated more directly by secreted molecules and adhesion proteins. 
Natural selection operates on these processes to favor adaptations that increase individual 
competitive abilities. The comparative simplicity of these mechanisms makes them more 
accessible to studies that tie evolutionary importance to mechanism. This is particularly 
important for studies of cooperation in the face of conflict because this has played an 
essential role in key life history transitions such as prokaryotic to eukaryotic cells, 
unicellular to multicellular organisms, and multicellular organisms to cooperative 
multicellular social organisms 7• 
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Cooperative behavior in microbes can result in the production of public goods 
excreted to the environment and then used for a wide range of processes such as 
increased motility, iron scavenging, and the formation of protective biofilms 2• A danger 
with a public good is that it could benefit non-producer individuals who can gain a fitness 
advantage because they do not pay the cost of the public good 8• When this happens 
within a generally cooperative framework, it is called cheating 9"11 • The control of 
cheating behavior is a major topic in understanding the evolution of cooperation 3•10•12-16• 
Studies that have looked explicitly at the evolution of cheating behavior include analyses 
ofbiofilm production in Pseudomonasjluorescens 11, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa 18, 
iron scavenging 13 and quorum-sensing 19 in P. aeruginosa, and spore-stalk contributions 
in Dictyostelium discoideum 20• 
Cheating can be controlled in a number of ways 10• Cheaters can be controlled or 
punished. Cooperative goods can be restricted to clonemates or to relatives. Hamilton's 
Rule explains cooperation, particularly among relatives. Hamilton's Rule (rb>c) states 
that cooperation is favored when the benefit (b) from the cooperative act times genetic 
relatedness between actor and beneficiary is greater than the cost (c) to the individual that 
provides the benefit 21 • Thus, to understand cooperation in microbes, it is necessary to 
understand who produces the public, beneficial good, who benefits from its production, 
and how the two are related. An example is found in studies of Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa. These bacteria need iron for growth and produce costly iron-scavenging 
siderophores to procure it, but these are a secreted public good that can be exploited by 
non-producers. Griffin eta/. showed experimentally that in mixed populations of 
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producers and non-producers of siderophores, high relatedness favored producers 
(cooperation) 13 • Also using P. aeruginosa, Harrison eta/. showed non-cooperators 
(hypermutable lineages) attained lower frequency under high relatedness conditions 
compared to cooperators when competed over 250 generations 22• The high mutation rate 
of the non-cooperators reduced the level of relatedness to other clone mates, causing 
cooperation to be less productive. 
Cheating can also be reduced by a variety of mechanisms that are sometimes called 
enforcement 16• Here one party has the power to influence the other party's behavior in 
some way. Dominant female meerkats may force pregnant female competitors out of the 
group or kill their offspring 23 • Honey bee workers remove eggs laid by other honey bee 
workers in favor of the queen's eggs, to which they are more closely related 24• 
Enforcement of various kinds, such as partner choice and punishment, is important in 
multi-species cooperation, where relatedness does not play a role 25 • It is less often 
invoked in single-species microbial systems, but bacteriocins are a plausible example, 
since killing non-clonemates is a way of protecting your own public goods 26,27• 
Cooperation is widely studied in the eukaryotic social amoeba Dictyostelium 
discoideum because of its unusual ability to form a cooperative multicellular body by 
aggregation, which can include genetically distinct lineages 4-6,2°,28'29• D. discoideum are 
solitary amoebae that reside in the soil and leaf litter where they engulf and consume 
their prey bacteria. When they stop finding prey and begin to starve, a major revision 
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occurs in the life cycle: thousands of cells come together that terminally differentiate into 
a multicellular structure known as a fruiting body. This fruiting body is composed of 
fertile spores in a sorus held aloft by a sterile stalk 30• Approximately 20% of amoebae 
that form the fruiting body structure altruistically give up their lives by forming the stalk 
to aid in the dispersal of the other 80% of amoebae who become spores. Cooperation 
here can benefit close relatives if genetically identical amoebae occur in close proximity 
and aggregate to form social groups 15• However, multiple lineages have also been found 
together on a small scale in about 0.2 gm soil samples 31 • Since genetically distinct 
clones are found in close proximity, the evidence suggests that it is possible for natural D. 
discoideum clones to experience intraspecific competition. Specifically, any clone that 
could produce mainly spores in a mixture with another clone, and induce its partner clone 
to produce stalk, could gain an evolutionary advantage. 
We call this kind of conflict between the cells of two cell lineages cheating, instead of 
normal competition, because it occurs in a cooperative framework. Competition is a 
broader category that includes interactions outside a cooperative framework. For D. 
discoideum, the cooperative standard is that each clone is expected to contribute the same 
proportion of the mixture to spore cells as it contributes to stalk cells. For example, if a 
clone is 5% ofthe total cells, it will be found as 5% of spore cells and 5% of stalk cells. 
Any ratio that resulted in a lower contribution to spores would indicate that this clone lost 
to the other clone in the mixture. Therefore cheating for D. discoideum is defined as 
allocating more than one's fair share to spores rather than to stalk when mixed in 
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chimera. Such cheaters have been found among wild clones of D. discoideum, and 
among genetically engineered knockouts 20•32• 
The existence of cheaters suggests mechanisms for cheater control should also exist 
10 Clones can avoid being cheated in several ways. Clones may segregate away from a 
potential exploiter using kin discrimination 4 • Ostrowski and colleagues extended these 
results by demonstrating that the greater the genetic distance between two clones, the 
greater the ability of kin to discriminate non-kin 5. Benabentos et al. identified two cell 
adhesion genes, tgrB and tgrC, as likely kin discrimination genes that could be used to 
avoid being cheated 6• High relatedness can also restrain cheating by opportunists. In 
high relatedness conditions, the benefits from the altruist stalk cells would mostly go to 
relatives satisfying Hamilton's rule. Using the knock-outjbxA-, a mutant that cannot 
make spores on its own, Gilbert and colleagues demonstrated this experimentally 15• This 
mutant cheats successfully at low relatedness, increasing its spore production, but as the 
frequency of jbxA- increases in a mixture, reduced spore production occurs for both 
clones in the chimera. A cheater of this type would be selected against at high 
relatedness, allowing cooperation to be maintained. 
Enforcement mechanisms and power also play a role in D. discoideum cheating. 
Ability to out-compete another and avoid being cheated can also be based upon condition 
ofthe interactant. When chimeras of cells fed with glucose (well-fed cells) and glucose-
starved cells are allowed to proceed through the social stage, well-fed cells were shown 
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to be more likely to become spores 33• Castillo and colleagues extended the results by 
stressing split populations of genetically identical cells by growth in more acidic 
conditions as well as in glucose-starved conditions and determined condition was not just 
dependent on sugar 34• They found clones in poorer condition contributed more to stalk. 
Another example that involves power is based on relative timing of starvation and 
aggregation. Cells can be maintained in a starving state for a few hours in buffer and 
then mixed with freshly starved cells. Kuzdzal-Fick and colleagues mixed genetically-
identical cells whose timing of starvation had been manipulated so one set was 
considerably earlier than the other, and found that the first amoebae to starve become 
spores 35• This is consistent with gaining an advantage by being the first to deploy 
offensive or defensive strategies. It has also been proposed that prespore cells force other 
cells to develop into stalk cells by secretion ofDIF (differentiation inducing factor), a 
chlorinated phenone that may have both signaling and forcing components 36• 
Recent work has found that another participant that could potentially affect 
competitive interactions among D. discoideum clones. We found about a third of wild 
D. discoideum clones have adapted to carry bacteria through the social stage and we call 
these clones farmers 37• Farming is a social trait that is vulnerable to cheating of a 
different form. The farmed bacteria are a costly resource that is potentially exploitable 
by non-farmers that do not pay the cost. D. discoideum clones were previously thought 
to enter the social stage after all available food prey were consumed 30• However, 
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farmers consume about half of the available food prey before entering the social stage 
compared to non-farmers 37• This life history difference is costly and results in reduced 
spore production for farmers compared to non-farmers when preferred food bacteria are 
abundant. The benefit of farming is apparent when preferred food bacteria are absent or 
rare. Soil, the natural habitat of D. discoideum, is a heterogeneous environment and 
plentiful, preferred food bacteria may not always be available. The preferred food 
bacteria carried by farmers are a valuable resource as shown when farmers and non-
farmers completed the social stage on unsterilized soil, the natural habitat of 
D.discoideum 37• The bacteria already present in this soil must not have been suitable for 
either farmers or non-farmers, but the carried bacteria of farmers allowed the farmers to 
flourish, producing many more spores than non-farmers. 
These preferred bacteria carried by farmers are potentially a public good available to 
any D. discoideum clone in the vicinity. If non-farmers who do not pay the cost of 
farming have equal access to this public good, they would do better than the farmers. We 
propose two possibilities to prevent exploitation of the preferred food bacteria. The first 
is high relatedness (i.e. clustering of cooperators). We know relatedness in D.discoideum 
fruiting bodies is high, so this is likely to be part of the reason farming works, but we also 
know that chimeras can occur 15, so other possibilities should be considered. A second 
possibility is active defense of the public good against exploiters. Honeybees defend 
their stored resouces by excluding non-nestmates from the colony 38• Fungus farming 
ants defend their fungus gardens against the fungal parasite Escovopsis, both by weeding, 
and by using a selective antibiotic produced by symbiotic actinomycetes carried by the 
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ants 39. Colicins are used by bacteria to keep their secreted public goods private by 
killing off competitors of different genotypes 40 . Prevention of exploitation could be 
important in providing a potential mechanism for maintenance of cooperative behavior 
between farmers and carried bacteria. 
In this chapter, we test whether D.discoideurn farmers protect their bacteria from 
exploitation by non-farmers, and we predict that farmers will produce more spores in 
mixed competitions with non-farmers. One reason to think they might, though we will 
not test this explicitly until Chapter 3, is that farmers carry bacteria they do not use as 
food 37. In this chapter, we will begin an investigation of the hypothesis that these non-
food bacteria may function to protect the food-bacteria resource. As the first step, 
however, we will simply test whether farmers can cheat or harm non-farmers as 
evidenced by reduced spore production. In Chapter 3 we explicitly test the effects of 
their non-food bacteria. The farmer's resources could be protected at two different 
stages. Farmers could combat the effects of co-occurring non-farmers by harming them 
during the feeding stage, presumably causing them to eat fewer of the farmer's bacteria. 
However, we restrict our current tests to the Dictyosteliurn social stage, when they do not 
feed, so that we can assess direct harm independent of any feeding differences. At this 
stage, harming the non-farmer will not immediately reduce food exploitation, because 
they are not feeding. However, by reducing the number of non-farmer spores produced 
in mixed aggregations, it should reduce the number of non-farmer spores that get co-
dispersed with farmer spores, and thus reduce exploitation in the subsequent vegetative 
stage. 
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2.3. Results 
To determine the impact of the farming clones and the bacteria they carry on the 
ability of non-farming clones to produce spores, we performed 10 pair-wise mixes, 
forming chimeras of the two different kinds of clones, farmers and non-farmers, at 
different frequencies. We used a population of 10 Dictyostelium discoideum clones that 
do not carry bacteria (non-farmers) and 9 D.discoideum clones that do (farmers). Thus 
there are 8 unique non-farmer/farmer pairs, while the last two non-farmers were paired 
with the same farmer (Table 2.1 ). We set up 5 conditions for the experiment mixes of 
non-farmer and farmer clones: 100:0, 95:5, 50:50: 5:95, 0:100. This permitted us to 
analyze differences of non-farmer success when they are clonal, common, equal, or rare, 
and also the reciprocal differences in farmer success when farmers are clonal, common, 
equal, or rare (i.e. when each is 100% or 95%, 50%, 5% in the chimera). We will use the 
term "frequency" to refer to these treatments, but note that when we are speaking of spore 
output of farmers, "frequency" means the frequency of farmers, and when we speak of 
the spore output of non-famers, it means the frequency of non-farmers. We determined 
the spore return per cell from the original number of amoebae used at the start of the 
social stage for each pair tested. 
Amoeba Pair Farmer-associated Bacteria 
Non-farmer Farmer Closest relative in Genbank o/o Identity 
QS1 QS22 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS6 QS8 Stenotrophomonas maltophi/ia K279 98 
QS9 QS21 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS14 QS21 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS17 QSll Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS18 QS155 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
QS154 QS159 Burkholderia phytofirmans psJN 98 
QS158 QS163 Burkholderia sp CCGEJ 003 90 
QS160 NC63.2 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 92 
NC75.2 QS23 Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 98 
NC174 NC105.1 Burkholderia sp CCGEJ 003 85 
Table 2.1 - List of D. discoideum farmer/non-farmer pairs and the host-associated 
potential defensive bacteria carried by the individual farmer. Additionally, all 
farmers also carry the lab food bacteria Klebsiella aerogenes. 
We performed a two-way ANOVA with replication, testing whether spore production 
varies by farmer status and/or frequency. We used fixed (farmer and non-farmer) effects 
and a random (clone) effect. Our two independent variables are farmer status and 
frequency. Our dependent variable, spore production, was normally distributed as 
assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test. There was homogeneity of variance as assessed by 
Levene's test for equality of error variances. We found a significant effect of frequency, 
no significant effect of farmer status, but most interestingly, a strongly significant 
interaction between farmer/non-farmer status and frequency (Farmer Ft,ts=0.02, 
p=0.8886; Frequency F3,s4=14.13, p<O.OOOl; Farmer*Frequency F3,s4=9.35, p<O.OOOl). 
Figure 2.1 shows the results, with significant differences found between spore outputs at 
different frequencies are indicated by different letters for non-farmers and farmers (post 
hoc Tukey tests). When clonal, non-farmers produce more spores than farmers, as was 
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also previously reported by Brock and colleagues 37. However, non-farmer spore 
production was strongly inhibited by increased frequency of bacteria-carrying farmer 
(Fig. 2.1 ). In contrast, we found no difference in spore production for farmers as 
frequencies changed under the same conditions. 
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Figure 2.1 - Spore production significantly decreases for non-farmers when mixed 
with farmers carrying their host-associated bacteria. We performed 1 0 non-
farmer:farmer pair-wise mixes and found non-farmers produce fewer spores per cell as 
the proportion of non-farmer in the mixture decreases. Spore production for farmers is 
the same in all mixture conditions. Significant differences found between frequencies are 
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designated by different letters as indicated by a post hoc Tukey test. Error bars equal 
SEM. 
We next used regression analysis to test specifically whether the differences in non-
farmer spore production are due to a general and linear effect of frequency, with 
frequency now used as a numerical rather than categorical variable. The regression of all 
non-farmer spore production results against the frequency of the non-farmer in the 
experimental mix revealed 56.6% (R square= 0.566) of the variance was explained with 
a p-value of< 0.001. This analysis allows us construct a model to predict with a high 
degree of certainty the expected spore/cell return of a non-farmer at any frequency when 
mixed in chimera with a farmer (Table 2.2). The expected spore production of a non-
farmer can be estimated using the following formula: spore production = 0.588 * 
frequency of non-farmer in the mix+ 0.37. 
Regression Coefficients 
Model U nstandardized Standardized t Sig. 
Coefficients Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 0.370 0.043 8.655 .000 
1 
Frequency 0.588 0.058 0.753 10.092 .000 
Table 2.2- Table of regression coefficients for model prediction. The constant value 
(0.37) and the frequency value (0.588) calculated from the regression analysis of 
spore/cell return of all non-farmers would allow predictions of spore/cell return to be 
made for any frequency on non-farmer in a mix with a farmer. 
Thus, increased frequency of the farmer appears to harm per capita spore production 
of non-farmers. It is worth asking whether this pattern is due to some subset of the 
experiments, perhaps because of variation in the bacteria carried. Remarkably, all 
individual results for non-farmer spore production are consistent with the overall pattern 
in the combined data as shown in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2. These results are shown in 
Figure 2.2. Nine out often non-farmers decline significantly in spore production as the 
farmer frequency increases, as determined by individual regression analyses shown in 
Table 2.3. These data show a quantitative effect on the dependent variable of 
experimental mix allowing us to falsify our null hypothesis that experimental mixture 
level has a consistent level effect. Farmers carrying B. xenovorans, B. phytofirmans, or S. 
maltophilia (QS6, QS8, QSll , QS21, QS22, QS23, QS159, and NC63.2) resulted in the 
greatest changes in spore production for the paired non-farmer when mixed in chimera. 
Two non-farmers, QS158 and NC174, however, had a more modest reduction in spore 
production. Both of these non-farmers were mixed with farmers carrying Burkholderia 
sp CCGE 1 003 and they were the only two non-farmers mixed with farmers carrying this 
bacterium. The regression analysis was significant for QS158 but not for NC174 as 
shown in Table 2.2. 
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Individual non-farmers 
QSl QSG QS9 QS14 QS17 
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Figure 2.2 -Individual graphs of each non-farmer alone and mixed in chimera with 
a farmer at different frequencies. We allowed 10 non-farmers to complete the social 
stage either alone (Cl =clonal or 100%) or mixed (Co= common or 95%, Eq =equal or 
50%, or Ra =rare or 5%) with farmers and determined the effect on the spores returned 
per initial cell of the non-farmer. Two independent replicas were performed; error bars 
equal SEM. 
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Non-farmer Farmer host-associated RSquare p-value bacteria 
QSl B. xenovorans LB400 0.834 0.002 
QS9 B. xenovorans LB400 0.857 0.001 
QS14 B. xenovorans LB400 0.917 <0.001 
QS17 B. xenovorans LB400 0.857 0.001 
QS160 B. xenovorans LB400 0.853 0.001 
NC75.2 B. xenovorans LB400 0.815 0.002 
QS6 S. maltophilia K279 0.777 0.004 
QS154 B. phytofirmans psJN 0.799 0.003 
QS158 Burkholderia sp CCGE 1003 0.681 0.012 
NC174 Burkholderia sp CCGE 1003 0.231 0.227 
Table 2.3 - Regression values for 10 individual non-farmers mixed at various 
frequencies with a paired farmer. All ofthe non-farmers except QS174 produced 
significantly fewer spores at higher concentrations of farmers. 
2.4. Discussion 
This study opens a new line of research in the interactions among D. discoideum 
clones based on whether or not they carry bacteria through the social stage. In this 
research we explore whether the adaptation of farmers to carry bacteria has increased the 
competitive ability of farmers against con-specifics, as might be necessary to keep their 
bacterial resource from becoming a public good. We determined whether or not D. 
discoideum clones carrying bacteria have an effect on spore production for non-farming 
D. discoideum clones in chimera. In these experiments we show that nine out of ten non-
farming clones produce significantly fewer spores per cell as compared to the number 
they produce as pure clones when non-farming clones are allowed to aggregate with 
farming ones. This result is not due to any feeding differences, since the entire 
experiment is done in the aggregative stage when the D. discoideum amoebae are not 
eating. We show that spore production by farmers is not reduced under the same 
conditions. Clearly, the farming clones of Dictyostelium out-compete non-farming clones 
and do so more severely at higher frequencies of farmers. Whether this remarkably 
consistent effect is due to the nature of the farming clones, or to the bacteria they carry is 
explored in Chapter 3. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that some of the 
farmer-carried bacteria are harmful to the non-farmers but not the farmer hosts, though 
this experiment does not directly implicate the bacteria. 
There are two different ways to produce more spores than expected in such mixtures 
29 A clone can "self-promote" which is to say that it increases its own spore production 
in mixtures. Alternatively, a clone can "coerce" its partner to produce fewer spores (and 
perhaps more stalk cells). Previous work with five natural clones showed a 
predominance of self-promotion in mixtures. In contrast, our work shows that farmers 
consistently coerce their non-farmer partners. This appears to be some kind of 
enforcement mechanism. 
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All but one non-farmer clone showed significant reduced sporulation in the presence 
of the farmer and its host-associated bacteria, as tested by significant regression 
coefficients. As the frequency of farmer in the mix increased, the spore production of the 
non-farmer declined. We investigate the impact of farmers carrying bacteria similar to B. 
xenovorans LB400 in the most detail, with one pair in duplicate, because it is the most 
commonly carried non-food bacterium. We also investigate two other species of 
Burkholderia and another species, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia K279. Farmers 
carrying B. xenovorans LB400, Burkholderia phytofirmans psJN, S. maltophilia K279 
and Burkholderia sp CCGE 1003 (QS8, QS 11, QS21, QS22, QS23, QS 159, QS 163, and 
NC63.2) resulted in significant changes in spore production for the paired non-farmer 
when mixed in chimera. Therefore the effect is not restricted to any one bacteria species. 
These data support the conclusion that associating with farmers and their host-associated 
bacteria is detrimental to non-farming D. discoideum clones. Furthermore, the more 
common the farmer is in the mixture, the greater the cost to non-farmers. 
This system may specifically prevent non-farmers from taking advantage of the food 
bacteria carried by farmers, i.e. it protects a valuable food resource from cheaters. 
Carrying bacteria comes with a cost to a farmer through reduced spore production when 
preferred bacteria are abundant. This cost must be balanced to maintain the cooperative 
interaction between the farmer and the host-associated bacteria it carries. Farmers can 
benefit greatly from carried bacteria in circumstances when preferred food bacteria are 
lacking at a site. We demonstrated this effect by comparing growth of famers and non-
farmers on two unsterilized soil samples containing native bacteria species 37• The 
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farmers proliferated much more than the non-farmers that had to depend on whatever 
bacteria was present in the soil, while the farmers could use their carried bacteria. 
However, this benefit of carrying and seeding preferred food bacteria is potentially 
public and exploitable by non-farmers. The harm we document to spore production of 
non-farmers in the social stage should have a downstream effect of protecting farmers 
against exploitation once the spores hatch. This will be the case if spores from the same 
fruiting body sometimes co-disperse. Co-dispersal seems likely since spores are sticky 
and are transported on motile organisms. This is would be less likely if the spores were 
wind-dispersed, but they are not 41 ,42• 
We propose two explanations for how farmers may be better competitors and protect 
their food bacteria resource. First, our data show that the adaptation to carry bacteria has 
increased the competitive ability of farmers by causing harm in some manner to non-
farming competitors. Support for such a mechanism has been found in other systems. 
Oh and colleagues found that ants use dentigerumycin produced by their symbiotic 
bacteria to inhibit the fungal parasite Escovopsis and protect their fungal garden 39• Scott · 
et al. found a similar mechanism in the beetle -fungus mutualism. An actinomycetous 
bacterium carried by the beetles produces an antibiotic that successfully inhibits an 
antagonistic fungus capable of out-competing the farmed fungus and disrupting larval 
development 43• In both of these examples, however, the farmers and the associated 
bacteria did not attack non-farmers, but rather competitors or pathogens of the crop. 
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Another similar system, but without the crop, is the Caedibacter-infected Paramecium 
that shed toxic non-reproductive bacteria containing a complex protein called an "R 
body" which kills uninfected Paramecium or Paramecium carrying a different 
Caedibacter species, thus providing a competitive advantage to the host 44•45 • 
High relatedness may provide a second way to prevent competitive threats against 
producers of public goods (i.e. farmers) that is not mutually exclusive ofthe first 
proposed above (enforcement). Relatedness is well-established as a control on cheating. 
This phenomenon was modeled by West and Buckling showing high relatedness can 
favor producers of public goods when both the dispersal of the producers and the public 
good itself are limited 46, and by S.R. Allison showing the producers of extracellular 
enzymes used to obtain essential resources was favored when enzyme diffusion was low 
so benefits go to the producers 47 . This was experimentally shown by Griffin eta/. 
showing high relatedness favored cooperation in mixed populations of producers and 
non-producers of siderophores 13, and Harrison et a/. showing high mutation rate reduced 
the level of relatedness and concomitantly reduced the level of cooperativeness causing 
the production of siderophores to be compromised 22• In the social amoeba D. 
discoideum, Gilbert eta/. demonstrated that the mutant.fbxA- which is unable to make 
spores on its own though it was able to make more than its fair share of spores in a group 
that included wild type cells, would be unable to persist at high relatedness because of 
negative selection against its own inability to make spores 15• The high relatedness 
observed in natural fruiting bodies should reduce exploitation of farmers by non-farmers, 
but since mixtures do occur, the direct competitive effects we have shown should also be 
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important. The results we found of harm (reduced spore production) for non-farmers in 
the social stage could be reflecting effects occurring in the vegetative stage where harm 
to non-farmers would serve to increase relatedness of farmers. 
Our results also show that each type does better when it is common in a mixture. 
Farmers do best if they are common enough to bring down the non-farmer's spore 
production. Non-farmers outperform farmers if there are not too many farmers to harm 
their spore production. If this were true on a population-wide scale, it would lead to 
positive frequency dependence, which would tend to make whichever type was more 
common even commoner, and eliminate the rare type 48• Instead we see both types 
maintained in both this 37, and other Dictyostelid species (data not published). High 
relatedness 15 may be the reason positive frequency dependence does not apply, or does 
not apply strongly. When groups are related, rareness of a type in the population does not 
equate to rareness in the groups in which it occurs. However, maintenance of both 
farmers and non-farmers in the population seems to require something like negative 
frequency-dependent selection (a rare-type advantage) and such forces have not yet been 
identified. 
Our design shows that increasing the percentage of farmers harms non-farmer spore 
production. This raises additional interesting questions to be addressed by future 
research. For example, is there similar harm during the proliferative stage when cells are 
growing and dividing? Indeed, the harm to the spore/cell production seen in the social 
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stage could be a reflection of the harm suffered earlier in the vegetative stage? 
Vegetative-stage effects might be even more important to competition because cells 
spend more of their time spent in this stage, and because it would directly reduce non-
farmer exploitation of farmed bacteria. A second important question is, what are the 
causative agents? Our experiment cannot yet preclude that the farmer amoebas 
themselves have the effect ofharming non-farmers. Tests of the effect ofthe bacteria 
alone, or of bacterial secretions, can address this question of the bacteria role. If bacteria 
are the cause, will farmers that carry different bacteria harm each other? Finally, 
whichever party causes the effect, the molecular basis of the effect remains to be 
explored. 
2.5. Materials and Methods 
2.5.1. Isolation of wild Dictyostelium discoideum strains. 
Isolation techniques followed published methods 31 with the exception that we 
collected 20g or more soil samples at each location instead of0.5g samples. Our study 
used a population of 19 wild D. discoideum isolates collected in this manner at Mountain 
Lake Biological Station in Virginia (GPS coordinates: N 37° 21 ', W 80° 31 ')and Little 
Butt's Gap, North Carolina. We used 10 non-farmer clones (QS1, QS6, QS9, QS14, 
QS17, QS154, QS158, QS160, NC75.2 and NC174) and 9 farmers (QS8, QS11, QS21, 
QS22, QS23, QS159, QS163, NC63.2, and NC105.1). All clones with a QS designation 
were isolated from Mt. Lake Biological Station in Virginia and all clones with a NC 
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designation were isolated from Little Butt's Gap in North Carolina. Pairs are listed in 
Table 2.1. The closest relative in Genbank for the host-associated farmer bacteria used 
for each pair is also listed for each farmer in Table 2.1. All farmers also carried the lab 
food bacteria Klebsiella aero genes (not-listed). 
2.5.2. PCR amplification and sequence identification of novel bacterial isolates. 
We followed the procedures outlined in "Identifying Unknown Bacteria Using 
Biochemical and Molecular Methods" found at 
www.nslc.wustl.edu/elgin/genomics/Bio3055/IdUnknBacteria06.pdf. We prepared the 
template DNA from each novel bacteria isolate as follows: First, we collected a small 
amount of stationary phase bacteria clonally grown on a nutrient agar plate and then 
resuspended the bacteria in 250 J.tl water (Sigma) in a 1.5 ml eppendorf tube. Next we 
placed the tube of cells in a dry ice bath for 3 min. We transferred the tube to a 90°C 
bath for 3 min. After repeating this cold/hot cycle 3 times, we centrifuged the contents of 
the tube at 13,000 rpm for 1 min. We collected the supernatant as the template DNA for 
PCR. The PCR amplification was done using a Gene Amp kit from Applied Biosystems 
(Roche). We used forward sequence: CGG CCC AGA CTC CTA CGG GAG GCA 
GCA G; reverse sequence: GCG TGG ACT ACC AGG GT A TCT AA T CC (Invitrogen 
Life Sciences Custom Primers (www.invitrogen.com/oligos) as the primers. The reaction 
was done in a PTC-100 (MJ Research, Inc.) thermal cycler as follows: 1 cycle@ 94°C 
for 3 min. (Denature) followed by 40 cycles @ 94 °C for 1 min. (Denature), 50°C for 1 
min. (Anneal), 72°C for 1 min. (Elongation) with a final 7min 72°C elongation step. We 
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sequenced the PCR fragments generated (using the above procedure) at Lone Star Labs 
(Houston, TX) and used the NCBI web site 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sutils/genom table.cgi as the search tool for sequences to 
identify bacteria to species. 
2.5.3. Culture conditions and mass plate preparation. 
We grew all wild isolates from spores on SM/5-agar plates in association with 
bacteria Klebsiella aero genes at room temperature. Three to five days after fruiting, we 
individually collected spores from wild isolates in 1.5 ml eppendorf tubes containing 
~400J...Ll of starvation buffer (2.25 g KH2P04 and 0.67 g K2HP04 per liter H20). We 
determined spore density with dilution using a hemacytometer and a light microscope. To 
prepare log growth amoebae, we plated 2x105 spores in 200J.ll K.aerogenes suspension in 
starvation buffer at an O.D. of 1.5 A600 on SM/5 plates. Using this plating regime, we 
previously determined that spore germination and amoeba log growth occur ~32-36 hours 
after plating (data not shown). We checked for log-growth of amoebae by taking core 
samples. We prepared core samples by pressing the large end of a sterile pasteur pipet 
into the agar plate and blowing out the agar core containing amoebae and bacteria into a 
1.5 ml eppendorftube containing 600J...Ll of starvation buffer. We determined amoebae 
density without dilution using a hemacytometer and a light microscope. When clones 
reached log phase growth, we added 5ml ice-cold starvation buffer to the plate and 
harvested the amoebae by using a gloved finger to rub off the amoebae and any uneaten 
bacteria. After collecting the above suspension in a 15 ml conical tube, we used 5 
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additional ml of ice-cold starvation buffer to wash the plate. Next, we centrifuged the 
collected amoebae/bacteria suspension at 1500g for 3 min. to wash the amoebae clean of 
bacteria, and we washed the pelleted amoebae in an excess volume of ice-cold starvation 
buffer 3 to 4 times depending on the amount of uneaten bacteria present. We determined 
the density of washed amoebae as above but with dilution. 
2.5.4. Competition assay. 
Using a population of 19 clones (10 non-farmers and 9 farmers), we competed each 
farmer against one unique non-farmer giving 10 pair-wise mixes with 2 independent 
replicas performed for each pair. We paired one farmer with two different non-farmer 
clones. We prepared log-growth amoebae as above in "Culture conditions and mass plate 
preparation". We labeled one clone of each pair fluorescently with Cell Tracker Green 
CMFDA (Invitrogen) to differentiate the clones in chimeras. Not all clones label well 
with Cell Tracker therefore the clone chosen for labeling for each pair is dependent on 
the ability to take up dye and retain it through the sporulation process. If both clones of a 
pair label well, the clone to be labeled is chosen at random. By chance, labeling of the 
pairs was about evenly split between farmers and non-farmers. Cell Tracker in DMSO 
was added at a concentration of 6.67 ~M to the clone being labeled and allowed time to 
be taken up by the cells. Then cells are washed free of unincorporated dye in starvation 
buffer during centrifugation. Unlabeled lines had an equal amount of DMSO without 
Cell Tracker added under the same conditions. We diluted all lines to a concentration of 
5x107cells/ml in ice cold starvation buffer for the assay. We mixed D.discoideum clones 
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labeled to unlabelled at the following non-farmer:fanner proportions: 5:95, 50:50, and 
95:5. Additionally, we plated both clones at 100% as controls for spore per cell 
productions. To assess for any labeling effects, we also plated the labeled line at 100%, 
as well as 50:50 labeled against unlabeled of the same clone and we saw no effects of 
labeling. We pipetted 25j..Ll of the control cells or mixes onto 0.8 j..Lm pore size 
nitrocellulose filters (Millipore) placed individually on starving agar plates (0.36gm 
Na2HP04, 1.98 gm KH2P04, and 15 gm agar per 1 liter H20). After 3-5 days, we 
collected the filters and placed them in a 1.5 ml eppendorftube containing 1.0 ml 
starving buffer+ 0.1% NP40 alternative. After briefly vortexing the eppendorf tube, we 
measured the proportions of unlabeled and labeled cells and the number of cells per j..Ll 
using an Accuri C6 flow cytometer. We used any loss oflabeling in the 100% labeled 
line (usually between 0.5-2% labeling) to adjust the data for all mix samples. 
2.5.5. Data analyses. 
For the competition assay we analyzed our data using standard analysis of variance 
methodology with fixed effects (farmer and non-fanner) and a random effect (clone) with 
all possible interactions for all experimental assays. Standard error and F -statistics were 
KR corrected (Kenward and Rogers 1997). The data analysis was generated using SAS 
software, Version 9-2 ofthe SAS System for Windows, Copyright 2002-2003, SAS 
Institute Inc. The regression analysis was analyzed using SPSS Statistics 20, Release 
Version 20.0.0 (SPSS, Inc., 2011, Chicago, IL, www.spss.com) with dependent variable 
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as spore production and frequency as constant in the overall regression. In the individual 
regressions, frequency and clone were constant. 
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Chapter 3 
Bacteria carried by Dictyostelium discoideum 
farmers harm non-farmers and enhance 
farmer proliferation. 
3.1. Abstract 
Symbiotic cooperation is an evolved positive interaction for both partners. Many 
symbioses involve bacteria with eukaryotes. The bacteria confer many advantages to 
their hosts; in some cases the advantage increases the host's competitiveness with 
conspecifics. Though Dictyostelium discoideum amoebae are natural predators of 
bacteria, some clones have recently been found to have a symbiotic relationship with 
bacteria and carry them through the non-feeding social stage. These D. discoideum 
clones are called farmers because they carry their food with them to seed new prey 
populations. However, some of the carried bacteria will not support D. discoideum 
proliferation. Here we focus on the role of these bacteria in their symbiosis with D. 
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discoideum. We hypothesize that these non-food bacteria may be used as a weapon by 
the host against other D. discoideum clones which would explain the observation that 
farmers consistently harm non-farmers in the social stage. To test this hypothesis, we 
chose a commonly found non-nutritive bacterium isolated from farmer D. discoideum 
hosts that is identified as close to Burkholderia xenovorans LB400. We looked at its 
impact on D. discoideum hosts and non-hosts using a filtered supernatant from these 
bacteria. We isolated host-specific B. xenovorans isolates from several D. discoideum 
clones and prepared individual supernatants from each of the clonally grown host-
specific bacterial isolates. We treated Dictyostelium clones at the beginning of the social 
stage to eliminate any feeding differences and found that the bacteria supernatant 
enhanced spore production of farming clones and reduced spore production of non-
farming clones. This is consistent with the view that these non-food bacteria have a 
direct beneficial effect on the Dictyostelium clones that carry them, increasing their 
reproductive ability by harming non-farmer competitors. 
3.2. Introduction 
Interactions among organisms can be fleeting or repeated, beneficial or antagonistic. 
Repeated beneficial interactions occurring between species are known as mutualisms and 
abound in the environment 1• These symbiotic interactions occur mainly for direct 
exchange of goods such as food or nutrients, or exchange of services such as dispersal 
and protection. Well-known examples of food or nutrient exchange encompass a wide 
range of behavioral associations such as farming of insects by ants 2, and fungus farming 
68 
by beetles 3, termites 4, and ants 5• More intimate exchanges of nutrients are found in the 
gut flora of vertebrates 6 and arthropods 7, and the association of mycorrhizae with plants 
8
• Familiar examples of exchange of services include dispersal ofpollen and seeds by 
insects and animals for the rewards of nectar and fruit 9• Common protection interactions 
range from cleaner fish and their clients 10, anemone fish and anemones 11 , and ant/plant 
associations 12• All of these many widespread mutualistic interactions among many taxa 
suggest robustness to the maintenance of such exchanges. But a perplexing question still 
anses. 
Providing a product or service for another organism, particularly in a mutualism, 
raises Darwin's question ofwhy one species would aid another. Darwin wrote "If it 
could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for the 
exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not have 
been produced through natural selection." 13 • This statement reflects the paradox we see 
in beneficial interactions between species. One species would not help another without 
indirectly helping itself. Mutualisms particularly are based on provision of a good or 
service that partners are unable to do alone. Much effort has gone into understanding 
how providing benefits to another species ends up providing a return resource. This 
effort is ongoing even today and multiple models have been proposed in the literature 14-
22 
Three main ideas have emerged from these models to explain the mode of action for 
evolution of cooperative interactions. These are byproducts, shared genes, and directed 
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reciprocation 19• The simplest idea is byproducts: helping another as a result of a self-
interested act involving no costs and no investment. An example of a one-way 
interaction is a dung beetle eating the dung excreted from an herbivore or omnivore. A 
similar type of helping can occur with multiple partners. For instance, larger groups can 
enhance fitness through increased predator protection and more efficient foraging 23 • An 
example is the cooperative founding of ant colonies by unrelated queens where initial 
grouping of multiple queens achieves higher fitness 24• Not as simple is byproducts 
reciprocity: enhancing the incidental benefit an individual receives from another 
individual by actively helping that individual. An example is found in the honeyguide 
(Indicator indicator Sparrman) and human mutualism 25 • The honeyguide greatly 
increases the efficiency of the nomadic Boran people of Africa in locating beehives in 
unfamiliar areas when guided providing the incidental benefit to the honey guide. 
The second idea is shared genes: an individual is more likely to provide a helping 
behavior to another individual if they share genes through descent from a common 
ancestor. Shared genes act within species only and encompass kin recognition and kin 
fidelity. Both are different forms of kin selection i.e. ways of ensuring benefits go to kin. 
Hamilton's rule has been the fundamental backbone of kin selection and highlights the 
manner by which altruistic cooperation can be favored between relatives. Hamilton's 
Rule states that helping will evolve when rb>c, where r is relatedness between the 
interactants, b is the benefit accruing to the individual being helped, and c is the cost of 
that helping to the altruist. Kin recognition facilitates altruism by elevating relatedness 
between helper and beneficiary. An example of kin recognition is found in a social 
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microbe Dictyostelium purpureum 26• When different isolates of D. purpureum are mixed 
and proceed through the social stage, they preferentially form fruiting bodies with 
amoeba of their own lineage through sorting by some recognition process. Kin fidelity is 
similar but is based on association conferred by spatial relationships of limited dispersal 
rather than on direct recognition of kin. An example of kin fidelity is found in an 
experimental evolution experiment for cooperation using production of siderophores in 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 27• Strains that produced the costly siderophores were only 
able to out-compete a cheater strain under limited dispersal where relatedness would be 
high. 
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The last idea is directed reciprocation: one partner suffers a cost to benefit another but 
the receiver partner in turn gives back a benefit with these benefits ultimately exchanged 
in a feedback loop. Two types of directed reciprocation are partner choice and partner 
fidelity feedback (PFF) and both can operate within species or between. In partner 
choice, interactants can change partners based on the behavior of the other interactant. A 
well-characterized example of partner choice is found in the bob tail squid and Vibrio 
jisheri symbiosis. The squid are born symbiont-free so partner choice occurs each 
generation 28• Each day after initiation, the squid expels most of its symbionts into the 
environment. Thus, partner choice also occurs each day because the squid can select on 
the luciferase activity of the symbionts remaining after expulsion choosing to interact 
with the partner that gives the greatest fitness return 29• In partner fidelity feedback, 
behavior is based on repeated interactions of partners. A well-known example of partner 
fidelity feedback is between mutualistic fungal endophytes and grasses. This type of 
symbiosis often has tight vertical transmission and both partners enhance the fitness of 
each other. The fungus protects the grass against herbivory by producing compounds that 
make it unpalatable while the grass provides nutritional provisioning to the fungus in a 
feedback process 8• 
Cooperative associations, including mutualistic ones, can be exploited by cheaters. 
Cheating, defined here as getting a mutualistic benefit without paying the cost, is a 
problem for the evolution of cooperation if cheaters can get higher fitness payoffs than 
cooperators. For instance, in interactions involving partner choice, cheaters are most 
often dealt with through sanctions by the cheated partner. An example is found in the 
legume-rhizobia symbiosis 30• The authors experimentally showed that a soybean was 
able to deny resources to rhizobia nodules that had been experimentally manipulated to 
be incapable of fixing nitrogen. This reduced the rhizobia's reproductive output by half. 
Somewhat similar sanctions are present is some fig-wasp mutualisms. Actively pollinated 
fig species punish non-pollinating fig wasps by dropping infected fruit killing the non-
pollinating fig wasp offspring 31 • Passively pollinated fig trees did not employ this 
sanction on non-pollinating fig wasps. 
Another way to reduce cheating is to explicitly defend against cheaters. Social 
insects commonly defend their resources from becoming public goods exploitable by 
other colonies. Within mutualisms, defense of partner- though not always against 
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cheaters - is a common benefit. One example is found between Paramecium and 
endosymbiotic species of Caedibacter bacteria. A Paramecium host infected with one of 
five endosymbiotic species of Caedibacter gains a competitive advantage for access and 
protection of food resources by a killer trait against other Paramecium 32•33• Caedibacter-
infected Paramecium shed toxic non-reproductive bacteria containing a complex protein 
called an "R body" which kills uninfected Paramecium or a Paramecium carrying a 
different Caedibacter species, thus providing a competitive advantage to the host 34•35 • 
This directed reciprocity (PFF) is thought to maintain the persistence of the killer trait as 
a balance to the lower growth and reproduction rates for the Paramecium host caused by 
the direct uptake of energy (ATP) by Caedibacter from the host. Another example is 
found in between the tall fescue grass, Lolium arundinaceum, and its symbiotic partner 
fungal endophyte, Neotyphodium coenophialum. Rudgers and colleagues found the 
fungal endophyte able to suppress the successional advance of grasslands to forests 36• 
Establishment and growth of trees was reduced, and this effect was due in part to 
_ increased predation on tree seedlings by voles because the voles found endophyte-
infected grasses unpalatable. Similar effects have also been shown between competitive 
hierarchies among grasses tested against fungal endophyte infections and insect herbivory 
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•
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• These effects suggest defense of partner increases the competitive ability among 
conspecifics and thereby aids in the maintenance of this partnership. 
An alternate way to defend your partner is to use another mutualist, i.e. a third party. 
Multiple levels of symbiotic interactions occur in the attine ant/fungus mutualism 39• The 
valuable fungus food resource is vulnerable to exploitation by contaminating 
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environmental fungus brought in on cut leaf surfaces gathered by the ants as fodder for 
the fungus garden. However, in one level of the interactions, actinomycetes housed in 
special cavities in the ant bodies secrete antibiotics used to protect their fungal garden 
from more competitive fungal parasites and prevent exploitation 40.41• Strong evidence 
for co-evolution has been found between ants, fungus and actinomycetes 42• In this 
instance, the tight vertical transmission would suggest partner fidelity feedback as the 
mechanism of action 42, but some partner choice is also possible due to the "weeding" of 
their fungal gardens 43• The important point, however, is that the fungal partner is a 
mutualistic resource and that the partners benefit from protecting that resource against 
parasites or cheaters that would exploit without returning any benefits. 
Bronstein suggested several needed research directions that had the promise to 
intersect different types of mutualisms and generalize how mutualisms evolved 44• One 
of these directions calls for research involving cooperative interactions within-species to 
contrast as well as look at similarities in between-species interactions. The eukaryotic 
amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum has a long history of just such intra-specific research. 
D. discoideum has been used extensively to study cooperation and conflict 26•4549. Two 
levels of cooperative interactions are found in this system. The first is well understood 
and occurs among D. discoideum cells when preferred food bacteria become scarce. 
Tens of thousands of D. discoideum amoebae cooperatively aggregate into a multicellular 
body capable of movement 50• When a suitable location is found, the aggregation forms a 
fruiting body in which about 20% of cells die, forming a stalk which lifts the remaining 
80% of cells a millimeter or so above the substrate in a structure known as a sorus where 
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the sporulation process proceeds. These hardy spores are dispersed and then hatch when 
they encounter favorable conditions. Because the multicellular body is formed from an 
aggregation, it may not be clonal. This can generate conflict as clones compete to stay 
out of the sterile stalk, instead favoring the fertile spore tissues 45•46•51 • The ability of a D. 
discoideum clone to bring a weapon into its social interactions may change the outcome 
of those interactions. 
The second level of cooperation, recently discovered and less well understood, is 
between D. discoideum and their host-associated bacteria. We previously reported that 
about a third of D. discoideum clones beneficially interact with bacterial partners and we 
call these clones farmers 52• Farmers carry more than one species of bacteria, and 
different clones can carry different species. All of these farmer clones can carry food 
bacteria through the spore stage, and can gain advantages by seeding out new populations 
of food after spore dispersal. We have previously shown that the bacteria that are 
randomly encountered in the soil may not be very good food for D. discoideum. This 
discovery means that the preferred bacteria carried by D. discoideum farmers are a 
particularly valuable resource that non-farmers may desire 52• 
Although farmers will always carry good food bacteria, they also sometimes carry 
other bacteria that do not seem to be good food for them 52• These could have no 
function, or they could be pathogens. However, we showed in chapter 2 that farmers can 
harm non-farmers in social-stage competition, so we will test the hypothesis that this is 
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caused by the non-food bacteria, adding another layer to the mutualism as shown in the 
ant/fungus/bacteria symbiosis 40• Many bacteria species produce a wide range of 
chemical defenses ranging from antibiotics, metabolic by-products, to bacteriocins 53•54• 
It is possible that some bacteria species carried by farmers could fall into this category 
and that their defenses help protect the mutualism. Farmers are prudent predators that 
enter the social stage while bacteria are still present, and they are therefore potentially 
vulnerable to exploitation by non-farmer clones that are not prudent and consume all 
available food 52. This valuable bacteria crop may be used by a non-farming competitor 
who does not pay the costs of farming, suggesting that farmers and their host-associated 
bacteria may have developed mechanisms to prevent such a loss, such as carrying toxic 
non-food bacteria. 
We isolated one apparent non-food bacteria species, Burkholderia xenovorans 
LB400, individually from several of our farmer D.discoideum clones. Many 
Burkholderia species are found as symbiotic partners with various eukaryotes 55• Here 
we investigate their role in increasing competitive ability of farmers over conspecifics, a 
phenomenon we documented in chapter 2. Burkholderia xenovorans LB400, previously 
known as Burkholderia fun gorum, is a gram-negative, non-sporulating, non-pathogenic 
bacterium with cells shaped as straight rods 56• At 9. 73 megabases, the genome of 
Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 is one of the two largest bacterial genomes known. 
More than 20% of the encoded genes are acquired by lateral transfer, which may account 
for the large niche breadth of this species 57• Burkholderia species can be found in a large 
number of diverse ecological niches both environmental as well as clinical 58-6°. It is 
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important to investigate these host/microbe interactions because expanding our 
knowledge can positively impact our understanding of interactions that crossover from 
beneficial to antagonistic. 
In this study we explore some aspects of the relationship between B. xenovorans and 
D. discoideum. We take advantage of the secretory nature of most interactions in the 
microbial world, and so test filtered supernatants from B. xenovorans for impacts on the 
social stage of D. discoideum. With this technique we explore the role ofthe bacteria in 
the symbiosis. We ask if the bacteria or secretions from these farmer-associated bacteria 
hurt non-farmers in the social stage. We explore individual variation on the impacts of 
the bacteria on D. discoideum by using supernatants from five different D. discoideum 
farmer-associated isolates of B. xenovorans, and we test the effect of these supernatants 
on the five clones that carry B. xenovorans and five clones that do not carry bacteria. We 
propose that these non-food bacteria produce secretions that benefit farmers in 
competition with non-farmers. If our hypothesis is true, this will give support to the 
generality of third party competition mediators as a mechanism to aid in the maintenance 
of symbioses. 
3.3. Results 
Proliferation of farmers and non-farmers in the presence of a non-food 
bacterium, Burkholderia xenovorans 
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We used an experimental population of 5 B. xenovorans-carrying fanners ( QS 11, 
QS21, QS22, QS23, and QS155) and 5 non-fanners (QS1, QS9, QS17, QS18, and 
QS 160). Previous observations suggested D. discoideum clones were unable to utilize 
any of the 5 Burkholderia xenovorans fanner-specific isolates as food We confirmed 
this by attempting to grow fanners and non-fanners in a pure culture of B. xenovorans 
(Bxll). We cultured spores collected from our experimental population in 100% B. 
xenovorans. As expected, non-fanners were completely unable to proliferate when solely 
provided with B. xenovorans (mean non-fanner spore production equals zero). The 
fanner clones were able to survive, proliferate a little, and produce only about a quarter 
of the number of spores as they produce on a good food bacterium, Klebsiella aerogenes 
(mean fanner spore production equals 134.7x106 +/- 45.6 x 106 s.e.m, roughly 10 cell 
doublings). 
To more fully examine this question in more natural conditions where multiple 
bacteria species are likely to be available, we used mixtures where an optimum food 
bacterium, Klebsiella aerogenes, was common and B. xenovorans was rare. The 
mixtures were 5% B. xenovorans with 95% K. aero genes and 10% B. xenovorans with 
90% K. aerogenes. We used 100% Klebsiella aerogenes as our control. We performed a 
two-way ANOVA with replication to test whether spore production varies in regards to 
fanner status and/or effect oftreatment. Our dependent variable, spore production, was 
normally distributed as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test; there was homogeneity of 
variance between groups as determined by Levene's test for equality of error variances. 
We found a strong interaction between effect oftreatment (percentage of Burkholderia) 
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and non-fanner/ fanner status (Fanner*Treatment F2,16=28.59, p<0.0001). The 
experiment showed an effect oftreatment (Treatment F2,16=78.38, p<.0001) and no 
overall affect of fanning status (Fanner F~,s=0.95, p=0.3588). In particular, non-fanners 
proliferated poorly in the presence of even a low proportion of B. xenovorans relative to 
their proliferation on K. aerogenes; significant differences found between fanners and 
non-fanners for all treatments are indicated by different letters, which reflect results of a 
post-hoc Tukey HSD test (Figure 3.1). For both 5% B. xenovorans, and 10% B. 
xenovorans, non-fanners produce significantly fewer spores than in the K. aerogenes 
control. Fanner spore production was unaffected in the 5% B. xenovorans treatment 
compared to the control. The fanner clones in the 10% treatment produced significantly 
fewer spores than in the control but were similar compared to the 5% treatment. We 
previously found that fanners produce fewer spores than non-fanners when grown on 
only K. aero genes 52• In this study we found the same pattern, but the differences were 
not significant (Fig. 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 -Spore production for D. discoideum non-farmer clones is greatly 
reduced even with a low initial proportion of B. xenovorans cells, while farmer spore 
production is not affected. Non-farmers produce significantly fewer spores in 5% 
Bx+95o/o Ka and 10% Bx+90o/o Ka compared to 100% Ka control while farmers have 
minimal change in spore production under the same conditions (Farmer F 1,s=0.95, 
p=0.3588, Treatment F2,16=78.38, p<.OOOI, Farmer*Treatment F2,t6=28.59, p<.OOOI; 
Significant differences found between farmers and non-farmers are indicated by different 
letters which reflect results of a post-hoc Tukey HSD test). 
Spore production by farmers and non-farmers in the presence of supernatant 
from a non-food bacterium, Burkholderia xenovorans. 
We measured the number of spores produced when log-growth amoebae from each of 
5 farmers and 5 non-farmers complete the social stage on filters soaked with bacteria 
supernatant. We did this to determine if B. xenovorans isolated from farmers are 
secreting small molecules into the environment that help the farmers by harming their 
conspecific competitors. This entire experiment involves the social stage, and not the 
proliferation stage. During the social stage, bacteria are not eaten. 
In figure 3.2.A, we show individual results of change in spore production on filters 
soaked with each B. xenovorans supernatant compared to filters soaked in buffer alone. 
Non-farmers produce significantly fewer spores than farmers in each individual 
supernatant (Bx21 and Bx22 p=0.0007, Bxll, Bx155, and Bx23 p<.OOOl; multiple 
comparisons adjustment-Tukey test). Overall, although different supernatants had 
different effects, change in spore production is strongly affected by farmer status, with 
non-farmers decreasing spore production compared to controls and farmers increasing 
spore production compared to controls (Figure 3.2.B; Farmer Ft.8=148.97, p<.OOOl, 
Super F4,32=6. 72, p=0.0005, Farmer* Super F4,32=2.04, p=0.1117). There was no 
significant interaction effect, and therefore no evidence that the different supernatants 
varied in their effects on farmers versus non-farmers. 
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Figure 3.2 -Non-farmers produce fewer spores than farmers that carry B. 
xenovorans in ailS B. xenovorans isolates from farmers. A) We tested 10 clones (5 
fanners and 5 non-fanners) for spore production in B. xenovorans supernatants prepared 
from 5 individually isolated fanner-associated strains. We measured the change in spore 
production compared to spore production in a buffer control. Non-fanners showed 
significantly reduced spore production compared to fanners, as displayed in the 
individual box plots. The left box plot of each graph represents the change in non-fanner 
spore production and the right box blot represents fanners in the various supernatants. 
B) Non-fanners produce significantly fewer spores than fanners as displayed in box plots 
ofthe combined data. (Fanner F 1,s=148.97, p<.OOOl, Super F4,32=6.?2, p=0.0005, 
Fanner*Super F4,32=2.04, p=O.l117). 
3.4. Discussion 
Here we extend our understanding of the stable, potentially cooperative interactions 
between the eukaryote amoeba D. discoideum and certain gram-negative bacteria. In an 
earlier study, we documented that about a third of clones carry bacteria with them 
through the normally sterile social stage. We showed that carrying these bacteria results 
in more or better food for D. discoideum than if they rely on random soil bacteria 52. We 
showed in chapter 2 that non-fanners are compromised in the social stage when mixed in 
chimera with fanning clones, but that study did not distinguish the impact of fanners 
clones themselves and their host-associated bacteria. Here we explored the interaction of 
D. discoideum fanners with the bacterial species directly. We focused on the D. 
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discoideum side of the interaction, saving the impact of D. discoideum on the bacteria for 
future work. 
To establish quantitatively the food or non-food status of apparent non-food bacteria 
carried by many farmer clones we tested growth and spore production in Burkholderia 
xenovorans. We choose B. xenovorans as our test species because it is the most common 
non-nutritive bacteria species isolated from farmers. We first cultured spores collected 
from our population of 10 D. discoideum clones in 100% Burkholderia xenovorans and 
we found non-farmer D. discoideum clones are unable to grow in pure cultures. 
Mortality was so severe that spore production for non-farmers was zero. However, 
farmers were able to produce some spores in this treatment, though far fewer than when 
they are reared on a better food bacterium. This evidence suggests that Burkholderia 
xenovorans isolates from our host farmers are indeed not used as a food bacteria species 
at least for non-farmers and verifies our initial expectation of non-food status for B. 
xenovorans. It is not clear whether the farmer clones are eating B. xenovorans or if they 
have carried and are feeding on the lab food bacterium Klebsiella aerogenes. Either way, 
it is clear that growing in abundant B. xenovorans is not ideal. 
The results above are consistent with B. xenovorans being harmful, not just to non-
farmers, but also to farmers. For B. xenovorans to have an advantageous defensive 
competitive effect against con-specifics, it would likely be at a lower frequency. Farmers 
would seed both B. xenovorans and a food bacterium like Klebsiella aerogenes, and the 
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slow growth rate of B. xenovorans would allow there to be abundant good food. The 
question then is whether a small amount of B. xenovorans is advantageous to farmers. 
Therefore, we more fully explored this question of a competitive defensive role for the B. 
xenovorans bacteria by culturing spores from our experimental population in more 
natural conditions. The mixes we used had an initial composition of 5% B. xenovorans 
and 95% K aerogenes, and 10% B. xenovorans and 90% K aerogenes with 100% 
Klebsiella aerogenes as our control. In the control treatment, farmers produce fewer 
spores than non-farmers when grown with abundant food, as we found previously, but it 
was not statistically different here, possibly because of the small population size (Figure 
3.1) 52• Interestingly, for growth injust 5% B. xenovorans+95% K aerogenes, non-
farmers produce significantly fewer spores than in the control significantly harming non-
farmer reproductive capacity, while the spore production for farmers was statistically 
unchanged. We found comparable results in the 10% B. xenovorans treatment The 
minimal amount of B. xenovorans needed for effects on con-specifics has similarities to 
the bacteria Xenorhabdus and Photorhabdus which also only need a few cells from 
colonization to protect the insect larva food resource of their nematode hosts 61 •62 • This 
evidence confirms our idea that B. xenovorans bacteria carried by farmers may play a 
competitive role in preventing food resource use by non-host D. discoideum. Our results 
are consistent with the detrimental effect on spore production of B. xenovorans at the low 
proportion that would be necessary for a proposed competitive role, considering the very 
slow growth rate of farmer-carried B. xenovorans. We therefore hypothesize the B. 
xenovorans bacteria carried by farmers may play a competitive role in preventing food 
resource use by non-host D. discoideum. 
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The detrimental effect could occur in two ways. The B. xenovorans bacteria could 
contain something that harms or kills the host when ingested, or more likely, these 
bacteria secrete some component into the surrounding environs that has the ability to 
harm non-host D. discoideum by reducing spore production. To more fully explore our 
competitive role hypothesis, we used five B. xenovorans isolates from five genetically 
different farmer strains. We examined the effect of secreted biomolecules by preparing 
supernatants from all 5 Burkholderia xenovorans isolates. We measured the number of 
spores produced when log-growth amoebae from each of 5 farmers and 5 non-farmers are 
starved and developed in conjunction with each of the 5 B. xenovorans supernatants 
(Figure 3.2). We found considerable and consistent harm to the reproductive capacity of 
non-farmers. A similar pattern was seen for Paramecium and its partner Caedibacter 33 • 
On the whole, non-farmers produce significantly fewer spores while farmers had an 
increased spore production, relative to what they produce in the absence of the 
supernatant. This pattern is recapitulated at the individual level in each of the 5 
supernatants, although the individual isolates showed variable levels of harm. 
This evidence verifies our hypothesis that the B. xenovorans farmer-carried bacteria 
isolates are detrimental to spore production of non-carriers. The evidence presented in 
chapter 2 suggested that B. xenovorans increases the competitive ability of their host 
farmers in competition with farmers, but did not rule out the possibility that the effect 
came from the farmers themselves. Now we have shown that some or all of the effect 
comes from B. xenovorans and that it is mediated though secreted products. However 
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this evidence does not eliminate the possibility that farmers themselves may also play 
some part in the attack on non-farmers. 
The parallels between ant farmers and D. discoideum farmers are striking (Figure 
3.3). Crops provide food to ant and D. discoideum farmers alike, with beneficial effects 
shown by arrows in Figure 3.3. Both types of farmer provide dispersal for their crop, but 
ants also cultivate their fungus by providing fodder for the fungus garden. Each farmer 
has a symbiotic relationship with bacteria and each employ products produced by these 
bacteria as weapons to defend their crops. Ants disperse their bacteria when starting new 
colonies as do D. discoideum farmers, but ants house their bacteria in special cavities 
while it is unknown how D. discoideum farmers disperse their bacteria to new sites. The 
bacteria reduce crop competitors, as represented by the T -shaped bar. This action inhibits 
exploitation of the crop resource, also represented by the T -shaped bar. In each case the 
farmer carries a third party that plays the role of a weapon against outsiders that would 
cheat the system. A difference is that in the ant system, the weapon attacks a competitor 
of the crop, while in our system the weapon attacks a competitor of the farmer. Both, 
however, are cheaters or parasites that would exploit the crop without paying any 
mutualistic costs. This is the first evidence that D. discoideum proto-farmers also engage 
in a form of cultivation. By carrying their non-food weapon bacteria, and thereby 
reducing non-farmer exploitation of the crop, they create better conditions for growth of 
the crop. However, we have not yet explored whether there are analogues of the ant 
behaviors of fertilizing and weeding their fungus crop in D. discoideum. 
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Figure 3.3 -D. discoideum and ant farmers have striking parallels in defense of their 
crops against exploitation. Solid arrows represent beneficial interactions such as food 
and dispersal; T -shaped bars represent harm. 
An important question is how the specificity of the interaction arose. It must be 
harder to specifically target conspecifics of the farmers, without harming the farmers, 
than it is to target an entirely different species, as in the ant-fungus system. B. 
xenovorans could have evolved to specifically target non-farmers that do not help it 
disperse. But this raises the question of how it does so; what are the consistent 
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differences between farmers and non-farmers that allow only the latter to be targeted? 
Such differences could exist given that the farmer trait may be quite ancient 52 . But a 
simpler explanation may be that B. xenovorans was initially harmful to both farmers and 
non-farmers. Farmers might routinely pick up somewhat harmful bacteria as a cost of a 
fairly non-specific mechanism that is beneficial overall. Through long association, the 
farmers may have evolved to minimize the deleterious effects of the bacterium and 
perhaps even to depend on it. The key traits that allow targeting of non-farmers would 
then be ancestral in farmers and non-farmers, and altered through adaptation in farmers 
only presumably through genes linked to those for farming itself. 
A definitive mode of transmission for farmer host-associated bacteria to the next 
generation of farmers is still unclear. Farmers carry different strains ofbacteria, migrate 
less far than non-farmers, and complete the social stage before all bacteria is consumed 
52
• This form of prudent harvesting and reduced migration may allow bacteria partners to 
be acquired from the environment with a similar environmental enrichment as seen in the 
squid-Vibrio symbiosis 28• This scenario could allow for partner choice as is also found 
in the legume-Rhizobium, legume-Burkholderia, and heteropteran-Burkholderia 
symbioses 63-65• The adaptations of farmers to growth in B. xenovorans as well as the 
increased competitive ability derived from the association may also argue for a long-term 
association with partner fidelity feedback as a stabilizing force in this interaction, as seen 
in the Paramecium-Caedibacter symbiosis 32• 
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In addition to an expansion of our understanding of potential evolutionary 
mechanisms to stabilize symbiotic interaction, there are many other rich possibilities for 
future work. A wider survey of wild clones of D. discoideum and the bacteria they carry, 
as well as the other bacteria available in the soil, would enhance our understanding of the 
specificity of these interactions. Laboratory work dissecting how readily farmers can 
pick up or lose bacterial associates would further the same end. We need a closer 
examination of the bacterial side of the story, the benefits and costs associated with being 
carried by farmers. Finally, we need to begin to understand the genetics and molecular 
mechanisms underlying these interactions. The tractability of D. discoideum as a model 
system should promote this goal, as has already been demonstrated with uncovering the 
genetics and mechanisms underlying their altruistic fruiting body formation. 
3.5. Materials and Methods 
3.5.1. Isolation of wild Dictyostelium discoideum strains. 
Isolation techniques followed published methods 66 2003 mol ecol] with the exception 
that we collected 20g or more soil samples at each location instead of0.5g samples. Our 
study used a population of 10 wild D. discoideum isolates collected in this manner at 
Mountain Lake Biological Station in Virginia (GPS coordinates: N 37° 21 ', W 80° 31 '). 
We used 5 farmers (QS11, QS21, QS22, QS23, and QS155) and 5 non-farmer clones 
(QS1, QS9, QS17, QS18, and QS160). The farmer clones we selected for our 
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experimental population carry Burkholderia xenovorans LB400 as well as the lab food 
bacteria used for culture 52. 
3.5.2. Culture conditions and mass plate preparation. 
We grew all wild isolates from spores on SM/5-agar plates (2 g glucose, 2 g 
BactoPeptone (Oxoid), 2 g yeast extract (Oxoid), 0.2 g MgC}z, 1.9 g KHP04, 1 g 
K2HP04, and 15 g agar/liter) in association with bacteria Klebsiella aerogenes at room 
temperature. Three to five days after fruiting, we individually collected spores from wild 
isolates in 1.5 ml eppendorftubes containing ~400J..Ll of starvation buffer (2.25 g KH2P04 
and 0.67 g K2HP04 per liter H20) buffer. We determined spore density with dilution 
using a hemacytometer and a light microscope. To prepare log growth amoebae, we 
plated 2x105 spores in 200J..Ll K.a. suspension in starvation buffer at an O.D. of 1.5 A600 
on SM/5 plates. Using this plating regime, we previously determined spore hatch and 
amoebae log growth occur ~32-36 hours after plating (data not shown). We checked for 
log-growth of amoebae by taking core samples. We prepared core samples by pressing 
the large end of a sterile pasteur pipet into the agar plate and blowing out the agar core 
containing amoebae and bacteria into a 1.5 ml eppendorftube containing 600J..Ll of 
starvation buffer. We determined amoebae density without dilution using a 
hemacytometer and a light microscope. When clones reached log phase growth, we 
added 5ml ice-cold starvation buffer to the plate and harvested the amoebae by using a 
gloved finger to rub off the amoebae and any uneaten bacteria. After collecting the above 
suspension in a 15 ml conical tube, we used 5 additional ml of ice-cold starvation buffer 
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to wash the plate. Next, we centrifuged the collected amoebae/bacteria suspension at 
1500g for 3 min. to wash the amoebae free of bacteria, and we washed the pelleted 
amoebae in an excess volume of ice-cold starvation buffer 3 to 4 times depending on the 
amount of uneaten bacteria present. We determined the density of washed amoebae as 
above but with dilution. 
3.5.3. Isolation of bacteria from wild D.discoideum farmer isolates. 
We picked up the sorus contents of6-12 random fruiting bodies developed on SM/5 
plates in association with E. coli or K. aero genes from each wild clone to be tested for 
farmer status using a filtered pipet tip. The sorus contents were spotted individually on 
SM/5 agar plates and assessed for bacterial growth after 2-5 days at room temperature. 
We collected bacteria from spots positive for growth using a sterile inoculating loop, re-
suspended the bacteria in one milliliter of starvation buffer, vortexed, and serially diluted 
in KK2. We spotted the serial dilutions individually on SM/5 plates and we collected 
individual colonies for species identification (for method see below in PCR amplification 
and sequence identification of novel bacterial isolates). 
3.5.4. PCR amplification and sequence identification of novel bacterial isolates. 
We followed the procedures outlined in "Identifying Unknown Bacteria Using 
Biochemical and Molecular Methods" found at 
www.nslc.wustl.edu/elgin/genomics/Bio3055/IdUnknBacteria06.pdf. We prepared the 
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template DNA from each novel bacteria isolate as follows: First, we collected a small 
amount of stationary phase bacteria clonally grown on a nutrient agar plate and then 
resuspended the bacteria in 250 ~1 water (Sigma) in a 1.5 ml eppendorftube. Next we 
placed the tube of cells in a dry ice bath for 3 min. We transferred the tube to a 90°C 
bath for 3 min. After repeating this cold/hot cycle 3 times, we centrifuged the contents of 
the tube at 13,000 rpm for 1 min. We collected the supernatant as the template DNA for 
PCR. The PCR amplification was done using a Gene Amp kit from Applied Biosystems 
(Roche). We used forward sequence: CGG CCC AGA CTC CTA CGG GAG GCA 
GCA G; reverse sequence: GCG TGG ACT ACC AGG GTA TCT AAT CC (Invitrogen 
Life Sciences Custom Primers (www.invitrogen.com/oligos) as the primers. The reaction 
was done in a PTC-100 (MJ Research, Inc.) thermal cycler as follows: 1 cycle @ 94°C 
for 3 min. (Denature) followed by 40 cycles @ 94°C for 1 min. (Denature), 50°C for 1 
min. (Anneal), 72°C for 1 min. (Elongation) with a final 7min 72°C elongation step. We 
sequenced the PCR fragments generated (using the above procedure) at Lone Star Labs 
(Houston, TX) and used the NCBI web site 
http: //www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sutils/genom table.cgi as the search tool for sequences to 
identify bacteria to species. 
3.5.5. D.discoideum spore production in B. xenovorans. 
We used a population of 10 clones: 5 B. xenovorans-carrying farmers (QS 11 , QS21 , 
QS22, QS23 , and QS155) and 5 non-farmers (QS1, QS9, QS17, QS18, and QS160). We 
tested spore production of the above clones grown in 100% K. aerogenes, 100o/o B. 
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xenovorans, or a mixture of 5% B. xenovorans and 95% K. aerogenes initial plating 
concentration or 10% B. xenovorans and 90% K. aero genes initial plating concentration. 
For this experiment, we used the B. xenovorans isolate from host farmer QS 11. We 
prepared and collected the bacteria for each experiment as above in "Bacteria supernatant 
preparation". We collected spores from each of the ten test clones as described above in 
"Culture conditions and mass plate preparation". For the assay, we plated 2 x 105 spores 
of each clone in each of the 4 bacteria conditions onto SM/5 agar plates. All clones 
formed fruiting bodies by 3days. We collected spores in a 15 ml conical tube by washing 
the plates with starvation buffer supplemented with 0.01% NP-40 alternative (~10 ml for 
each clone). We vortexed each 15 ml conical tube briefly to evenly disperse the spores 
and determined the density by counting using a hemacytometer and a light microscope. 
3.5.6. Bacteria supernatant preparation. 
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We used five Burkholderia xenovorans isolates identified (see chapter 1, Table S2) 
from five genetically different farmer strains as our test population of bacteria. 
Previously, we prepared clonal isolates of each bacteria strain at the time of isolation 
from the farmer host. To do this, we plated the isolates on SM/5 plates, allowed them to 
reach stationary phase, harvested the bacteria in starvation buffer, and then froze them in 
20% glycerol at "80°C. We prepared the bacteria for each experiment by starting from the 
frozen clonal isolate, streaking on an SM/5 plate using a sterile inoculating loop, and then 
incubating at 21 °C until stationary phase was reached. For the experiment, we collected 
the stationary phase bacteria with a sterile inoculating loop, placed the bacteria in a 30ml 
conical tube containing KK2, vortexed to obtain a homogeneous solution, determined the 
initial density using an Eppendorf™ BioPhotometer, and then set the density to 1.5 A6oo 
by diluting with starvation buffer. To prepare the supernatant, we used a New Brunswick 
C 1 Platform Shaker set at speed 25 to gently rotate the bacteria suspension for one hour 
at 21 °C. Next, to isolate the bacteria supernatant from the bacteria, we centrifuged the 
bacteria suspension in an EppendorfCentrifuge 5804 Rat 12,000g (13,000 rpm) for 10 
minutes at 4°C. We decanted the supernatant to a fresh, sterile conical tube and placed 
the tube at 4°C. Lastly, we filtered the supernatant through a 0.2J..Lm sterile syringe filter 
(Millipore™) to remove any remaining live bacteria not removed by pelleting. We kept 
the prepared bacteria supernatant on ice until experimental set-up. Previously, we 
determined a maximum range of activity for supernatant dilutions (data not shown). At 
set-up we prepared dilution of the supernatant in starvation buffer equivalent to the 
bacteria suspension set at O.D.600 of0.15. 
3.5.7. Supernatant experimental assay. 
We used a population of 10 clones, 5 B. xenovorans-carrying farmers (QS11, QS21, 
QS22, QS23, and QS155) and 5 non-farmers (QS1, QS9, QS17, QS18, and QS160). We 
collected log-growth amoebae from each of the ten test clones as described above in 
"Culture conditions and mass plate preparation". For the filter pad assay, we used 
150x15mm petri plates lined with 2layers ofWhatman™ #3, 125mm circle filters 
(Schleicher &Schuell) soaked with either starvation buffer for the control or bacteria 
supernatant (see preparation above in "Bacteria supernatant preparation") laid with a grid 
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of equidistant 13 mm square AABP 04 700 (Millipore, Bedford, MA) black filter squares. 
We spotted the filters individually with 1.25 x 1 06 amoebae in KK2 and made duplicate 
samples for each clone for each experiment. We allowed the clones to hatch, grow, and 
develop under direct light to limit potential movement of slugs before final culmination 
to fruiting bodies. Development was complete for all clones after about 24 hours. We 
allowed the spores to mature in the fruiting bodies an additional 24-48 hours before 
collection. At that point, we collected each filter by placing the filter in a 1.5 ml conical 
eppendorftube containing 1.0 ml starvation buffer+ 0.1% NP-40 alternative. We 
vortexed each eppendorf tube briefly to evenly disperse the spores and counted as above 
without dilution to determine density. We calculated spore number for experimental 
treatments as a percent change compared to control based on spore number recovered 
from starvation buffer control samples. 
3.5.8. Data analyses. 
We analyzed our data using standard analysis of variance methodology with fixed 
(farmer and non-farmer) effects and random effect (clone) for the Dictyostelium vs. 
bacteria assay, supernatant assay, spore length, mass determination, and spore viability 
assay. The data analysis was generated using SAS software, Version 9-2 of the SAS 
System for Windows, Copyright 2002-2003, SAS Institute Inc. 
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